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ABSTRACT
Same-sex relationships will likely be in violation of the laws of most African countries.
In Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya, a same-sex relationship is either explicitly prohibited or
there is legislation which can be interpreted to prohibit the union. However, the growing
trend of the institutionalization of same-sex marriage around the world means that even
countries that do not domestically recognize same-sex relationships may be confronted
with the challenge of dealing with it in a conflict of laws context. The discussion shows
that the strict application of the rule of non-recognition, where the court gives no legal
effect to a foreign same-sex union, is unworkable and lead to arbitrary and unfair results.
African courts should use the incident approach to differentiate between cases where the
parties seek adversarial court procedures, such as those dividing marital property, from
those which seek to legitimize the union.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1. Problem Overview
There have been varied views on same-sex relationships in Africa. The debate has
focused on whether particular states should or should not recognize same-sex
relationships. While some view same-sex relationships as un-African, others believe such
relationships existed among some indigenous African tribes. In countries such as Uganda,
Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe, calls have been made for same-sex relationships to be
explicitly banned. Indeed, the current trend of legislation and public abhorrence of
homosexual activity does not reveal the acceptance of same-sex relationships in most
African countries.1
However, an important but often ignored aspect of the debate is how such
relationships should be handled by the conflict of laws regimes in African countries. Will
a same-sex marriage celebrated in Canada be recognized in Ghana? Will the children of a
same-sex Nigerian couple who reside in UK be allowed to inherit their parent’s estate in
Nigeria? Can an American same-sex couple adopt a child residing in Nigeria? The
objective of this research is to find answers to the cross-border legal questions about
same-sex relationships. Indeed, the nature of conflict of laws is such that even countries
that do not formally allow institutionalization of same-sex relationships may be
confronted with the challenge of dealing with it in a conflict of laws situation.

1

Recently, Nigeria and Uganda enacted anti-same-sex laws (see Nigeria: Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition)
Act, 2014 and Uganda: The Anti-Homosexuality Act, 2014). President Yahya Jammeh of Gambia has also
been quoted to have stated that his government “will fight these vermin called homosexuals or gays the
same way we are fighting malaria-causing mosquitoes; if not more aggressively” (see Satang Nabaneh,
“Crusade to root out Homosexuality like Malaria” AfricLaw. 7 April, 2014 online:
http://africlaw.com/tag/president-yahya-jamme/>).

1

Alongside the attempts to criminalize same-sex relationships, there have been
some moves to positively acknowledge such unions. For example, in May 2012,
Malawi’s new President, Joyce Banda, expressed her intention to scrap laws
criminalizing homosexuality.2 In South Africa, civil unions in the form of marriage or
civil partnerships are permitted by law.3
Given the dearth of scholarship on this issue, this thesis aims to provide an
authoritative treatment of the subject in Africa. Legislation and case-law in Africa have
dealt with the conflict of laws aspects of same-sex relationships only in passing, if at all.
The law in some African countries defines marriage as “the voluntary union of a man and
a woman intended to last for their joint lives”.4 In many countries, marriage is not
expressly defined by statute. However, it can be argued that on a true and proper
interpretation of the relevant statutes, they envisage only relationships between a man and
a woman. The definition of marriage as a union between a man and a woman dictates that
same-sex relationships will not be recognized as marriage, and, accordingly, the parties to
such a union would not be entitled to any of the benefits/obligations that come with
marriage. The question is whether states that do not domestically recognize same-sex
marriage will give effect to it in a conflict of laws sense when such unions are celebrated
abroad.
Contrary to the position taken in many African countries, in South Africa, civil
unions solemnized either as a marriage or civil partnerships are recognized. In 2006,
2

“Malawi to Overturn Homosexual Ban, Joyce Banda Says”, BBC NEWS (May 18, 2012), Online:
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18118350>.
3
Civil Unions Act,2006 (Act No. 17).
4

See for examples, Sierra Leone: Matrimonial Causes Act,1950 s. 2; Kenya: The Matrimonial Causes Act,
1941 (Chapter 152) s. 2; Tanzania: Law of Marriage Act, 1971 (No. 5) s. 9(1).
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South Africa enacted the Civil Union Act, 2006, after a series of judicial decisions which
challenged the non-recognition of same-sex relationships.5 The objective of the act is to
regulate the solemnization and registration of civil unions, by way of either a marriage or
a civil partnership, and to provide for the legal consequences of the solemnization and
registration of civil unions. The act does not deal directly with the legal consequences of
marriage. Article 13 of the act provides that the legal consequences of a marriage
contemplated in the Marriage Act, 19616 apply with such changes as may be required by
the context of a civil union. The Act also provides that, with the exception of the
Marriage Act and Customary Marriages Act,1998,7 any reference to marriage in any
other law includes a civil union, and husband, wife or spouse in any other law includes a
civil union partner.
The position in South Africa may be contrasted with that in Zambia, and that
proposed in Nigeria. In Zambia, a marriage between persons of the same-sex is void.
Under section 27(1)(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 20078 a marriage shall be void if
the parties to the marriage are of the same-sex. This is perhaps the clearest prohibition on
same-sex marriage in Africa. In 2014, a significant statute was also passed in Nigeria to
prohibit same-sex marriage: the Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, 2014. The tenor of
the act left no doubt as to the intention of its framers. Significantly, from a conflict of
laws perspective, it deals with both the celebration and recognition of same-sex

5

Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie 2006 (1) S.A. 524; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v.
The Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of
Home Affairs 2000 (2) S.A. 1. See generally Pierre De Vos, “A Judicial Revolution? The Court-Led
Achievement of Same-Sex Marriage in South Africa” (2008) 4 Utrecht Law Review 161.
6

Act 25.
Act 120.
8
No. 20 of 2007.
7
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marriages. Under section 1 of the Act a marriage contract or civil union entered into
between persons of the same-sex is prohibited. A marriage contract or civil union entered
into between persons of the same-sex is invalid and illegal, and the parties shall not be
recognized as entitled to the benefits of a valid marriage. Also a marriage contract or civil
union entered into between persons of the same-sex by virtue of a certificate issued by a
foreign country shall be void in Nigeria, and any benefits accruing by virtue of the
certificate shall not be enforced by any court of law in Nigeria. Finally, under article 3 of
the Act, only marriages contracted between a man and a woman shall be recognized as
valid in Nigeria.
The above reveals an unsettled state of law and contrasting approaches to the
issue of the conflict of laws aspects of same-sex relationships in Africa. In light of the
increasing pressures to accommodate such relationships, and the inevitability of the
conflict of laws regime in Africa being invited to resolve issues involving them, this
thesis addresses the following novel questions:


What has been the approach of African conflict of laws regimes to what, for want
of a better phrase, may be described as non-traditional types of adult sexual
relationships?



Which aspects of African conflict of laws regimes may be directly engaged by
same-sex relationship issues and to what extent are the regimes ready to address
those issues?



What has been the approach of Western conflict of laws systems, including those
of Canada and the UK, to the conflict of laws aspects of same-sex relationships,

4

and are there any lessons African countries may find useful in the West’s
approaches?
The fact the same-sex relationship may be unrecognised and that conflict of laws
issues associated with it may be unaddressed, can lead to many social ills. Conflict
scholars are all too familiar with the problem of limping marriages. With the world
gradually but surely moving towards accepting and institutionalizing same-sex
relationships, the need to address all the attendant legal issues, including conflict of laws
issues, is clearly of supreme importance. Canada and the United Kingdom are among the
few countries that recognize same-sex marriage under legislation. In addition to the
recognition of same-sex unions, these two countries have moved from the position of
blanket non-recognition of other “odious foreign marriage”9 considered a violation of the
UK’s and Canada’s laws, to granting recognition in specific instances. This thesis
explores how the private international law issues generated by these unions are variously
resolved, and the extent to which the approaches in these two countries may be useful to
English-speaking African countries which are facing similar situations. Drawing on the
jurisprudence in the two countries, this thesis argues that the approaches used in the UK
and Canada to recognize certain foreign unions that are not allowed in their jurisdictions
may be used when English-speaking African countries are faced with similar problems in
relation to same-sex marriage.
This thesis is organized into five chapters. This chapter provides the introduction.
Chapter two focuses on the nature of marriage and other forms of adult relationship in
9

See in general L. Lynn Hogue, “Examining a Strand of the Public Policy Exception with Constitutional
Underpinnings: How the ‘Foreign Marriage Recognition Exception’ Affects the Interjurisdictional
Recognition of Same-sex "Marriage" (2005) 38 Creighton Law Review 449 at 453.

5

English-speaking Africa. It explores what constitutes marriage in these countries and the
various “deviations” from the traditional form of marriage (i.e. the union between one
man and one woman) that are allowed, especially in legislation. Chapter two also
identifies the common private international law issues that arise within the context of
marriage and how they are commonly resolved in these countries.
Chapter three explores how the private international law issues generated by
same-sex marriage and other forms of foreign unions that are not domestically recognized
in the United Kingdom and Canada are addressed in these two jurisdictions. Both are
leading common law jurisdictions, and legislation and case law, especially from the UK,
have very strong persuasive weight in English-speaking Africa. The goal is to explore the
various ways in which the issues are resolved and the extent to which the approaches in
the two countries may be useful to English-speaking African countries when they are
faced with similar situations.
Chapter four focuses on the English-speaking African countries that have little or
no experience with same-sex marriage, in the sense that there is no legislation on the
subject (e.g. Ghana), recent legislation on the subject (Nigeria), or contemplation of
legislation on the subject. Using the analyses in chapter three as the context, this chapter
explores how these countries can approach the various private international law issues
that may come their way regarding same-sex marriage, irrespective of whether there is an
express legislation on the subject. The chapter uses hypothetical case scenarios, proffers
solutions to those scenarios and assesses the merits of those solutions.

6

Finally, Chapter five provides a conclusion. It argues that a rule of blanket nonrecognition of same-sex marriage will lead to unfair and unjust results.
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CHAPTER TWO: HETEROSEXUAL MARRIAGES IN AFRICA AND CONFLICT OF
LAWS PERSPECTIVE
1. Introduction
African countries are characterized by mixed legal systems. The sources of law in
most English-speaking Africa countries are made up of domestic legislation and the
English common law. Decisions of English courts thus have a real persuasive effect in
most English-speaking African countries. The francophone countries are characterised
with the codification system from French. Both systems reflect the influence of
colonization of most of the African countries. In addition to this foreign influence, it is
not surprising to find individuals in one country governed by a host of different personal
laws. This mixed system is particularly evident in regard to marriage. In most African
countries marriage can be categorized into three types: statutory marriage (civil
marriage), customary marriage and religious marriage. The co-existence of seemingly
equal legal systems in one legal sphere provides the avenue for residents to contract
marriage under any of these systems. However, the marriage must satisfy the
requirements under the applicable law or custom for it to be valid. While the state
regulates marriage in each jurisdiction, the extent of state involvement varies from one
jurisdiction to another and from one form of marriage to another. Civil marriages are
mostly celebrated under statutory laws, while customary marriages are celebrated and
regulated under the custom and practices of each community. The co-existence of
different forms of marriage creates a complex web of legal issues from a conflict of laws
perspective.

8

This chapter focuses on the nature of marriage and other forms of adult
relationships in selected English-speaking African countries.10The focus of this chapter
will be to discuss the different forms of marriage, namely, civil marriage, customary
marriage and religious marriage, using specific examples chosen Anglophonic Africa. It
explores what constitutes marriage in these countries and the various “deviations” from
the traditional forms of marriage (i.e., the union between one man and one woman) that
are allowed, especially under legislation. For example, in some of the countries under
study, “woman-to-woman” marriage is allowed, whereas in other countries, same-sex
marriage is prohibited. The scope of the union may also vary (e.g., cohabitation and
common law partnerships). The chapter also identifies the common private international
law issues which arise within the context of marriage and how they are commonly
resolved in these countries.
The chapter has 4 sections. Section 1 discusses the different forms of marriage in
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. This section provides an overview of the
institution of marriage as understood in the context of the countries under study.
Essentially, the section explores the concept of marriage in the countries under study.
Section two also provides how the conflict of laws issues relating to marriage are
resolved in these jurisdictions. The section also identifies the internal and international
conflict of laws issues which may arise from the co-existence of different marriage
systems and how they are resolved. Given that woman-to-woman marriage is not
common among the countries under study, the institution of woman-to-woman marriage
and the conflict of laws issues relating to this is separately evaluated in section 3. Section
10

Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda and Zambia. These countries are representative of all the
regions in African south of the Sahara – west, east and south. Also, it is easy to access materials on these
countries.

9

4 concludes that the approach adopted by English-speaking African countries to
recognize certain marriages deviating from the traditional definition of marriage may be
used to recognize foreign same-sex marriages.
2. Types of Traditional Marriage
2.1 Civil Marriage in Africa
Civil marriages in Africa share a lot of similarities with the institution of marriage
in jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and Canada.11 The definition of marriage in
most English-speaking African countries is not different from that of the UK and Canada.
In most legislation, marriage is considered the union of one man and one woman for life
to the exclusion of all others. This is understandable, given that civil marriage is
regulated under the received laws of most African countries. Common law in most
Anglophone African countries comprises the doctrine of equity and judicial decisions
from the UK. In addition, most English-speaking African countries have in place
prohibited degrees of marriage legislation similar to that of the UK and Canada. The next
section looks at the nature of marriage in English-speaking African countries in the
context of civil marriage. Emphasis is placed on capacity and nature of marriage – gender
of the parties, age, and the nature of the relationship between the prospective couples.

11

However, unlike the United Kingdom and Canada, civil marriage has not traditionally been viewed as
what constitutes a marriage relationship in the countries under study. In Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, South
Africa, Uganda and Zambia, customary marriages have existed prior to the introduction of civil marriages.
With the introduction of civil marriage, people can choose which legal system, the statutory or the
customary law, that should apply to them.

10

2.1.1

Capacity and Nature of civil marriage

2.1.1.1 Gender of parties and nature of marriage
Civil marriages are strictly monogamous and, in most countries, they may only be
contracted by opposite-sex couples. A civil marriage must comply with the appropriate
legislation and the existing common law. While some countries define marriage in their
legislation, in most cases marriage is not defined under family law statutes in Africa. In
Kenya, “marriage” is defined as the voluntary union of one man and one woman for life
to the exclusion of all others.12 Marriage is also defined via a heterosexual lens in
Tanzania13 and other countries.14 Where marriage is not specifically defined, an analyses
of the marriage formula in various statutes reveals that what is envisaged is a union
between a man and a woman. In most Anglophone countries, pronouncement of a couple
as man and wife is the marriage formula administered by marriage registration officers.
In Ghana, after the solemnization of the marriage, the registrar of marriages is to address
the parties as man and wife and the parties are to attest by signing their names as man and
wife.15 This is also the position in Nigeria, where the parties are to be pronounced as
husband and wife.16 In South Africa this marriage formula was challenged in the case of
Minister of Home Affairs v. Fourie.17 The court accepted the argument that the marriage
formula envisaged is a union between a man and a woman and was thus discriminatory

12

Kenya: Matrimonial Causes Act,1941, s. 2. Section 2 of the Kenya Marriage Act also interprets “spouse”
to mean a husband or wife.
13
Tanzania’s Law of Marriage Act, 1971 defines marriage to mean the voluntary union of a man and a
woman, intended to last for their joint lives. See in general Tanzania: The Law of Marriage Act, 1971, s 9.
14
In Uganda marriage is not explicitly defined to mean a union between a man and a woman, however, the
marriage formula under The Marriage Act contemplates a union between a “man and wife. See generally
Uganda: The Marriage Act, 1904 (Chapter 251), ss 20-30.
15
See Ghana: Marriage Ordinance, 1951(CAP 125) s 36.
16
Nigeria: Marriage Act, 1990 (Chapter 218), s 27.
17
2006 (1) SA 524.
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against same-sex couples.

However, most Anglophone African countries have the

common law definition of marriage in the context of civil marriage.18
It must be mentioned that a man already involved in a customary marriage cannot
conclude a civil marriage with another woman.19 So, where one party was already
married under customary law, the High Court in Ghana held that the presumption of the
continuance of the customary marriage was so strong that in the absence of any evidence
in rebuttal, the purported civil marriage under the Ordinance was null and void and of no
effect.20 In Nigeria, a civil marriage cannot be entered into where either of the parties
thereto at the time of the celebration of the marriage is married under customary law to
any person other than the person with whom the marriage is had.21 The first marriage
must be dissolved before another civil marriage can be entered into.22
However, it should be mentioned that parties are allowed to convert an existing
customary marriage to a monogamous marriage.23 In one case in which the parties
married in the Catholic Church before a marriage officer appointed under Ghana’s
Marriage Ordinance and in the sight of witnesses, the court held that each and both of
them, by that ceremony, changed their status as man and wife under customary law for
that of husband and wife under the Marriage Ordinance, a completely new union which
could confer obligations, rights, and privileges totally different from those under
18

In Hyde v. Hyde, (1866) LR 1 P&D 130 Lord Penzance emphasized the heterosexual character of
marriage and also the fact that the union should be for one man and one woman to the exclusion of all
others.
19
However, in Kenya, the court of appeal in the case of Irene Njeri Macharia v. Magret Wairimu Jomo &
Another, Civil Appeal No.134 of 1994 ruled that under the provisions of s.3 (5) of the Law of Succession
Act, 1984 (CAP 160) a marriage under customary law will be recognized even if there was another
monogamous marriage where polygamous marriage are allowed.
20
Genfi II v. Genfi II, [1964] GLR 548- 551.
21
See, supra note 16, s 33. See also CAP 125, supra note 15, s 31.
22
There is legislation which allows spouses of a customary marriage to convert their marriage into a civil
marriage.
23
See South Africa: Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, 1998 (Act 120) s 10.
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customary law marriage.24 A successful conversion of a customary marriage to a
monogamous marriage constitutes a renunciation of the rights, obligations and privileges
under customary law and the parties cannot again claim the benefit of the provisions of
customary law. However, there are no provisions regarding whether a civil marriage may
be converted to customary marriage.25 The only avenue for the party wishing to marry
under customary law after successfully contracting a civil marriage may be to divorce
under the civil marriage and re-marry under customary law.

2.1.1.2 Age
There are differences in terms of the ages at which parties may contract marriage.
The age requirement differs from one jurisdiction to another.26 In Kenya, a person shall
not marry unless that person is at least eighteen years old.27 In Ghana, the Marriage
Ordinance, 195128 does not specify the marriageable age. However, for the purposes of
the Ghana’s Children’s Act,29 a person below the age of eighteen is considered a child 30
Also, consent may form part of the essential requirements of marriage where either party
to the marriage is a minor. In some jurisdictions, consent from the parents of a child may

24

Graham v. Graham, [1965] GLR 407-418.
See at Gugulethu Nkosi “Indigenous African marriage and same-sex partnerships: Conflicts and
controversies” (2007) 2:2 International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and
Transdisciplinarity 203.
26
Under the United Nations Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and
Registration of Marriages, 1964, state parties are to specify a minimum age for marriage. However, the
provision must completely eliminate child marriages and the betrothal of young girls before the age of
puberty (see Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of
Marriages, 1964, Article 2).
27
Kenya: The Marriage Act, 2014 (Act No. 4) s 4.
28
CAP 125.
29
Ghana: The Children's Act, 1998 (Act 560).
30
Ibid, s 1.
25
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be required where the child is below the marriageable age. 31 Like the limitation on the
age of marriage, the provisions on parental consent are instituted to protect minor
children from early marriage. In Nigeria, if either party to an intended marriage is under
twenty-one years of age, the written consent of the father and/or the mother must be
produced and annexed to the affidavit before a license can be granted or a certificate
issued for the marriage.32 The issue whether parental consent is necessary for the
celebration of a valid statutory marriage in Nigeria arose in the case of Agbo v. Vudo.33
The facts as reported were that
[t]he plaintiff contracted a statutory marriage with his wife. He later
petitioned the court for dissolution of the marriage on the ground of his
wife’s adultery with a correspondent. The correspondent contended that
the wife was minor at the time the marriage was celebrated, and that no
valid marriage existed between the applicant and his wife, which the
court might dissolve. It was held that notwithstanding the absence of
parental consent the marriage was valid under S. 33 (3) of the Marriage
Act.34
It is, however, an offence for someone knowing that the written consent has not been
obtained to marry or assist or procure any other person to marry a minor under the age of
twenty-one years.35 In South Africa, a marriage may be dissolved on the ground of want
of consent if an application is made by a parent or guardian of the minor before he attains
majority.36

31

CAP 125, supra note 15, ss 27-29.
See, supra note 16, s 18.
33
(1947) 18 NLR 152.
34
Intergovernmentalmarriagereg, The Legal Frame Work of the Statutory Marriage, online:
<http://intergovernmentalmarriagereg.org/Nigeria/general/2-uncategorised/15-lectures-ref-2012tw-04>.
35
See, supra note 16, s 48.
36
South Africa: Marriage Act, 1961, s 24A.
32
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2.1.1.3 The nature of the relationship between the prospective couples
In some cases, persons falling within a certain category may be prevented from
marrying each other. These persons are commonly said to fall within the prohibited
degrees of affinity or consanguinity. This functions to limit intermarrying between two
closely-related relatives. While some of these unions are limited for moral reasons, others
have a scientific undertone. For example, it has been emphasized that multiplication of
the same blood by in-and-in marrying incontestably leads in the aggregate to the physical
and mental depravation of the offspring.37 Also, some of these limitations are meant to
prevent sexual rivalry in the family and to protect the children, for whom this situation
might be confusing and disturbing.38
However, the degree of prohibition varies from country to country. In Kenya, a
person cannot marry that person's grandparent, parent, child, grandchild, sister, brother,
cousin, great aunt, great uncle, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, great niece or great nephew.39
In addition, a person cannot marry a person whom that person has adopted or by whom
that person has been adopted. This seems to be the position in Nigeria where marriage of
a man is prohibited if the woman is, or has been his ancestress, descendant, sister,
father’s sister, mother’s sister, brother’s daughter, sister’s daughter, wife's mother, wife’s
grandmother, wife’s daughter, son’s wife, etc.40 However, unlike Kenya, Nigeria makes
provisions for two persons who are within the prohibited degrees of affinity to marry

37

See generally Ottenheimer Martin, Forbidden Relatives: The American Myth of Cousin Marriage
(Illinois: University of Illinois, 1996).
38
Jens M. Scherpe, “Should There Be Degrees in Prohibited Degrees?” (2006) 65:1 Cambridge Law
Journal 32 at 33-34.
39
Supra note 27, s 10.
40
See generally, Nigeria, Matrimonial Causes Act 1990, Schedule 1.
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each other on an application to court.41 However, nowhere in Nigeria’sMatrimonial
Causes Act is the phrase “exceptional circumstances” defined. It may be said that these
are situations where the circumstances of the particular case are so exceptional as to
justify the applicants marrying one another.42 Ghana has no specific rules on prohibited
degrees but, in general, a marriage may not be lawfully celebrated which if celebrated in
England, would be null and void on the ground of kindred or affinity.43 This essentially
means that no person shall marry another person if they are related lineally, or as brother
or sister or half-brother or half-sister, including by adoption. The position in Ghana
requires some clarity. One question which may be asked is whether changes in the
category of person under the prohibited degrees in the UK equally applies to Ghana? This
is important given that in the UK, a marriage may now be solemnized between a man and
a woman who is the daughter or grand-daughter of a former spouse of his (whether the
former spouse is living or not) or who is the former spouse of his father or grandfather
(whether his father or grandfather is living or not).44

2.2 Customary Marriage
Customary marriage in Africa varies widely between countries and between the
many thousands of ethnic groups and cultures. Unlike statutory marriage, there seems to
be no common standard in regard to the celebration and regulation of customary marriage
in Africa. What may seem to be common in most Anglophone African countries is the
recognition of the polygamous nature of customary marriages. In most jurisdictions
41
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customary marriage has been defined to be potentially polygamous. The fact that a man
married under customary law decides to stay only with one wife does not change the
customary union into a monogamous marriage. In addition to polygamous marriage, there
are other forms of customary unions in Africa. These unions have existed prior to the
introduction of monogamous marriage in Africa. In this section, the different forms of
customary marriage in Africa are considered.

Polygamy may be defined as the state of marriage to two spouses. However, this
definition is limited to the situation where a man is married to more than one wife at a
time. Polygamy is prominent in many African countries.45A polygamous marriage serves
as an opportunity to mobilize labor and, therefore, to establish a wealth-creating
enterprise. Most religious marriages, like Islamic marriage, are polygamous in nature
(and such unions are later considered under religious marriages). In most instances,
customary marriage in Africa and polygamous marriage have been used interchangeably.
It is not surprising to hear people referring to customary African marriage as polygamous
marriage. It is, however, worth noting that polygamous marriage is an aspect of
customary African marriage.
In most English-speaking African countries, there seems to be an option for
domiciled inhabitants to contract valid polygamous marriages where they are governed
by customary law. Polygamous marriage under customary law is a lawful marriage
recognized by the laws of Ghana.46 In Ghana, where a marriage has been contracted
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under customary law, either party to the marriage or both parties may apply in writing to
the Registrar of Marriages for the customary marriage to be registered. 47 However, the
registration of a customary marriage only gives it evidential value. In South Africa, it has
been held that, non-registration or failure to register a valid customary marriage does not
affect its validity.48
Unlike civil marriages, the existence of a customary marriage is not a bar to the
man marrying another woman. A man may enter into any number of marriages, provided
that the subsequent marriage is otherwise valid. However, it seems that in South Africa, a
man cannot just decide on his own to take a second wife without consulting the relevant
stakeholders, including the wife concerned.49 This is to make sure that the first wife is not
prejudiced by the arrangement. However, in Mayelane v Ngwenyama,50 the
Constitutional Court of South Africa held that the consent of a first wife was not
necessary for the validity of her husband’s subsequent customary marriage.

One common type of customary marriage in Africa involves unions between close
relatives. Some of these unions may fall under the prohibited degrees of marriage in most
American and European countries. Marriage between relatives may also involve people
already related from previous marriages. A man may marry his wife's brother's daughter
(his niece-in-law). Although these unions are permitted in some African countries, the
extent of recognition of some of these unions are not uniform. A marriage may be
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lawfully celebrated in Ghana between a man and the sister or niece of his deceased
wife.51 In Nigeria, the marriage of a man is prohibited if the woman is, or has been his
wife's mother, wife's grandmother, wife's daughter, wife's son's daughter, wife's
daughter's daughter, sister mother's sister, father's sister, etc.52 In Kenya, it is prohibited
for a person to marry that person's grandparent, parent, child, grandchild, sister, brother,
cousin, great aunt, great uncle, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, great niece or great nephew.53
These prohibitions, however, relate to Christian or civil marriages, but the prohibition of
the marriage of a person with that person's cousin does not apply to persons who profess
the Islamic faith.54

2.3 Common Law or Presumptive Marriages
The concept of “presumption of marriage/ common law marriage” is not new in
African customary law.55 Presumption marriages in Africa are not significantly different
from the English common law marriage arising from cohabitation. The significant
difference between the common law presumption of marriage as practiced in Africa is the
capacity of the man to contract another marriage while the presumed marriage subsists.
Unlike under the English common law marriage it is debatable whether a common law
marriage as understood in Africa constitutes a bar for the man to enter into another
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marriage with another person. Like many customary marriages, a presumptive marriage
is potentially polygamous. The Kenya Court of Appeal has stated that
before a presumption of marriage can arise a party needs to establish
long cohabitation and acts of general repute; that long cohabitation is
not mere friendship or that the woman is not a mere concubine but that
the long cohabitation has crystallized into a marriage and it is safe to
presume the existence of a marriage.56
In essence, a stable permanent relationship between two persons of the opposite
sex who had not been married to each other, but, nevertheless, lived a life akin to that of
husband and wife is accorded the same status as marriage. In most of the countries under
study, there are no specific laws regulating presumptive marriages. Common law
marriages usually come up only in cases of inheritance when one of the parties has
passed away and the other wants to partake in the estate or the termination of a
relationship. To achieve this status, there must be evidence illustrating that the
relationship is of a permanent nature. In a claim for succession in the case of Phylis Njoki
Karanja & 2 others v Rosemary Mueni Karanja &another the courts found that the
deceased cohabitated with the respondent from 1984 to 1994; the relationship gave rise to
one child; the respondent brought the two children whom she had given birth to with
another man to the matrimonial home to which the deceased never objected; and other
family members of the deceased, including his mother and brother, accepted the
respondent as the deceased’s wife and recognized her as such both during the
advertisement for and at the deceased’s burial. The court concluded that the evidence was
enough for a marriage to be presumed between the deceased and the respondent. 57 The
court presumed the existence of a marriage due to lengthy cohabitation and circumstances

56
57

See Phylis Njoki Karanja & 2 others v Rosemary Mueni Karanja & another, [2009] eKLR.
Ibid.

20

showing that although there was no formal marriage, the parties intended to live and act
together as husband and wife.58

2.4 Religious Marriage in Africa
While Muslim marriage59 and Hindu marriage are mostly considered under
religious marriage, Christian marriage and traditional marriage have respectively been
categorized under civil marriage and traditional marriage. A religious marriage must
comply with the marriage requirements of the particular religion to be considered valid.
In Ghana, a marriage by a Mohammedan, according to Mohammedan law, is at its very
best a marriage by customary law, unless the marriage has been registered under the
Ordinance.60 It is the registration of the marriage which confers statutory validity on the
marriage. In South Africa, a Muslim marriage is invalid unless it is registered as a civil
marriage under the provisions of the Marriage Act, 1961.61Until recently, South Africa
held on to the position that Muslim marriages are contrary to public policy. In Ismael v.
Ismael,62 the court held that Muslim marriage is contrary to the principles of public
policy owing to the fact that it does not prohibit polygamy. This position is, however,
debatable, given that customary marriage is potentially polygamous in South Africa.63

58

See also J M M M v EGM, [2014] eKLR.
In Africa Muslim marriage is variously referred to as Islamic marriage, Mohammedan marriage, Muslim
marriage etc.
60
See Ghana, Marriage of Mohammedans Ordinance, Cap. 129 (1951 Rev.) ss 5, 10. See also Kwakye v.
Tuba and Others, [1961] GLR 720-725, Brimah, Cobsold v. Asana, [1962] 1 GLR 118-120 and Barake v.
Barake, [1993-94] 1 GLR 635—668.
61
Act 25.
62
1983 (1) SA 1006.
63
See generally Amandus Reuter, Native Marriages in South Africa: According to Law and Custom
(Münster [Ger.]: Aschendorff, 1963).
59

21

The Constitutional Court in the recent case of Daniels v Campbell NO and Others64 set
aside the High Court order which declared that marriages by Muslim rites have not been
recognized by South African courts as valid marriages because such marriages are
potentially polygamous and hence contrary to public policy (whether or not the actual
union is in fact monogamous). The Constitutional Court ruled that a spouse in an Islamic
marriage was entitled to be regarded as a spouse for the purposes of intestate
inheritance.65
Kenya’s Constitution grants jurisdiction to the Kadhi court to determine questions
of Muslim Law relating to personal status, marriage, divorce and inheritance in
proceedings in which all parties profess the Muslim religion.66 In most jurisdictions,
Mohammedan marriage is potentially polygamous.67 A man may marry more than one
wife with or without the consent of the first wife.
In terms of Hindu marriage, South African Hindu marriage is regulated under
statutes. In Kenya, “Hindu” means a person who is a Hindu by religion in any form
(including a Virashaiva, a Lingayat and a follower of the Brahmo, Prarthana or Arya
Samaj) or a person who is a Buddhist of Indian origin, a Jain or a Sikh by religion. 68
Unlike Mohammedan marriage, the institution of Hindu marriage is not well developed
in Africa. In South Africa, it has been stated that polygamy is the sole obstacle to the
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recognition of Hindu marriages.69 The courts have stated that Hindu marriage is
monogamous in character.70

3. Conflict of laws Issues in Statutory, Customary, Common law and Religious
Marriages
It is trite that states have the right to determine what happens within their borders.
This sovereign right includes matters relating to the legal recognition of marriages.71 In
general, the conflict of laws approach to the recognition of marriage in Africa has been
that in order for a foreign marriage to be recognized, the marriage must satisfy both the
formal requirements of the place where the marriage was celebrated and the essential
requirements of the laws of the domicile of the parties involved. Most Anglophone
African countries apply the lex loci celebrationis to determine whether the marriage is
formally valid, and the lex domicilii as to whether the parties had the capacity to marry
under the laws of their respective pre-nuptial domicile.72 However, the application of the
principle is subject to the public policy of the forum – policy in relation to age and degree
of consanguinity, etc.
In a claim for succession under Ghana’s Marriage Ordinance, the High Court in
Ghana concluded that the marriage entered into between the applicant and the deceased
was a customary marriage and not one under the Ordinance. Applying the lex loci
69
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celebrationis, the court accepted the argument of the defendant that the forms and
ceremonies for the marriage entered into, evidenced marriage under Togo customary
law.73 In Nigeria, a foreign marriage is not valid if the purported marriage is not valid
under the law of the place where the marriage has taken place.74 The provision places
emphasis on the place where the marriage was solemnized. However, South Africa
applies the lex loci celebrationis to determine both the essential and the formal
requirements of marriage.75 In essence, the validity of a foreign marriage is determined
under the place where the marriage was celebrated. In Chitima v. RAF,76 the High Court
of South Africa held that the validity of a foreign marriage celebrated in Zimbabwe
should be determined by Zimbabwean law. Oppong argues, however, that “this position
is not free from doubt since there are cases which appear to suggest that the essential
validity of marriage is regulated by domicile”.77
Given that monogamous marriage is accepted by many African countries, there
seems to be no contention as to the recognition of such marriages by any forum court. If
parties had capacity to marry under their respective domiciles, the marriage would
typically be recognized. Thus, a civil marriage, valid under the respective domiciles of
the parties and the place of celebration will generally, be recognized as valid in most
African countries.
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There are, however, exceptions regarding marriages involving minors. Where the
policy of the forum court prohibits marriage involving minors, the question arises
whether such a marriage which was validly entered into in one country will be recognized
in the forum country.78This situation may, however, be assessed on a case-by-case basis,
and the court will take into account whether injustice will be caused if the marriage is not
recognized.79 The court may also adopt the same approach in cases falling under consent.
Another potential conflict of laws situation will be marriages falling under the
prohibited degrees. It is debatable whether marriages falling under these prohibited
degrees may be accorded recognition in other jurisdictions. In the context of civil
marriage, most African countries follow the common law prohibition of marriage
between relatives. Ghana family law policy prohibits marriage between a man, his sister,
mother and daughter. Kenyan law prohibits any marriage between a person and that
person’s grandparent, parent, child, grandchild, sister, brother, cousin, great aunt, great
uncle, aunt, uncle, niece, nephew, great niece or great nephew.80 However, Nigeria
allows some of these unions in limited circumstances.81 How will a Kenyan court treat a
marriage between a man and his mother’s brother’s daughter? These and many other
questions may be encountered under the plurality of the prohibited degrees in Africa. It
78
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may be stated that the non-recognition of these unions may still hold on grounds of public
policy. However, the context of a particular case may shape the outcome for the courts to
recognize some of these unions for specific purposes.82

As discussed above, polygamy is recognized as an institution of marriage in many
African countries. This makes the recognition of foreign polygamous marriage less
contentious in Africa.83 In the context of conflict of laws, there is a favorable attitude
towards polygamy in Africa. Many African countries domestically recognize polygamy
as a form of marriage. It seems where the marriage satisfies both the laws and customs of
the jurisdiction where the marriage was celebrated, the marriage will be recognized as
valid in the forum country. However, the forum court must be satisfied that the marriage
has been validly contracted under the custom of a particular group. This is a matter of
fact to be proved by the party relying on the existence of the marriage.84
When considering whether the marriage has been validly contracted, the court
may take into account issues such as prior consent of both spouses.85 This will usually be
82
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the case where the forum state’s public policy prohibits forced marriages. In Kenya, a
decree of nullity of marriage may be made if the consent of either party has not been
freely given.86 In such a case, notwithstanding that the marriage may have been validly
contracted under the lex loci celebrationis, the court may nevertheless refuse recognition.
In addition, the court may take into account the respective ages of the parties. This is to
satisfy the court that neither party is a minor. This may, however, be contentious where
the marriageable age of the forum state differs from that of the place where the marriage
was celebrated. In this case, it is debatable whether the forum court can rely on its own
laws to nullify a marriage sanctioned by another state.
It can be concluded that given the prevalence and acceptance of polygamous
unions in the legislation of most African states, the recognition of such unions across
borders may not create any problem from a conflict of laws perspective.
The question whether a court will recognize a marriage from another jurisdiction
between relatives is not well settled in Africa. The reason may come from the differences
in the relationships falling under the prohibited degrees in various countries. The
existence of plurality in customary practices under prohibited degrees of marriage
presents conflict of laws problems. This may be attributed to the fact that most statutes
provide for the application of the customary law that prevails within the area of the
jurisdiction of the court. In many towns in Ghana, for example, there are several systems
of customary law which may be followed by members. This may give rise to internal
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conflict of laws.87 Thus, a conflict of laws situation could even arise domestically
between two communities in Ghana where the court may have applied the custom of one
community to determine the validity of a marriage celebrated under that custom. While
some states prohibit certain unions in their legislation, primarily for civil marriages,
whether two parties can enter into a valid marriage under customary law is left to the
customs and practices of the particular community. In South Africa, prohibition of a
customary marriage between persons on account of their relationship by blood or affinity
is determined by customary law.88The Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration)
Law, 198589 in Ghana also makes no provision for which relationships under the
prohibited degrees cannot be registered under the Law. The result is that, while certain
unions are allowed in some countries, the same unions may be prohibited in another
country. For instance, in some parts of Ghana, customary law allows a man to enter into a
valid marriage with his wife’s sister, whereas such unions are prohibited in Kenya.

Unlike places such as Canada and the United States, where presumptive
marriage/cohabitation is well regulated under the family law system, the institution of
cohabitation has not been given the needed attention in the countries under
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study.90Whether a marriage can be presumed is a question of fact to be proven by the
party asserting the existence of the marriage. This is because no registration occurs in the
establishment of a common law marriage. The presumption does not depend on the law
or system of marriage in a particular community. In essence, a party seeking to rely on a
presumptive marriage will have to establish by the preponderance of evidence that such a
marriage exists. This assumes constant cohabitation and a general reputation as spouses.
From a conflict of laws perspective, it seems a court may recognize a presumptive
marriage if such a marriage has been established by the court of the parties’ domicile and
place of celebration. However, as with any other marriage, recognition of a common law
marriage may be refused if the marriage is viewed as conflicting with strong public
policy in the forum state. As well, a marriage cannot be presumed in favor of any party
in a relationship in which one of them is married under statute.91 Presumption marriages
are mostly in cases where parties do not lack capacity to marry.
As noted above, religious marriage is accepted in most African communities. The
domestic recognition of this sort of marriage by most African states makes the conflict of
laws aspect of religious marriages less contentious. A marriage valid under the particular
religion in terms of formality and meeting the essential requirements will be recognized
by the forum state. There is no apparent reason why religious marriages may not be
recognized by a forum court. One issue that may, however, arise is where the forum state
does not domestically recognize the polygamous nature of such marriage. In South
Africa, for example, plural marriages formed under religious law (e.g., Hindu, Muslim)
90
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are not accepted. However, considering the application of the conflict of laws rules in
South Africa the courts are likely to give effect to the consequences of a religious
marriage celebrated outside South Africa.

4. Woman-to-woman marriage
The institution of woman-to-woman marriage is not well acknowledged in Africa.
However, it has been said that woman-to-woman marriage is widespread in African
patrilineal societies, although the way it functions varies from society to society. 92 In the
context of same-sex marriage, “woman-to-woman marriage” deserves attention because
of its semblance to lesbianism. This may suggest that same-sex union is,in actuality, not
new in Africa. According to Katakami, woman-to-woman marriage refers to a woman
who takes on the legal and social roles of husband and father by marrying another woman
in accordance with the approved rules and ceremonies of her society. 93In this type of
marriage a female takes another female as her “wife”. She performs all the necessary
customary rights and ceremonies associated with a valid marriage in her community and
stands in the position of a husband to the wife. Woman-to-woman marriage may involve
a surrogate female who takes the position of a male solely for the purposes of providing
offspring for the male’s family. This is commonly used in kinship situations. The purpose
of a union such as this is to provide a male heir.94 In describing the institution of womanto-woman marriage as it relates to the Nandi people of Kenya, Cotran emphasized that
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a woman past the age of [among the Nandi and Kipsigis] child-bearing
and who has no sons, may enter into a form of marriage with another
woman. This may be done during the lifetime of her husband, but is
more usual after his death. Marriage consideration is paid, as in regular
marriage, and a man from the woman’s husband’s clan has sexual
intercourse with the girl in respect of whom marriage consideration has
been paid. Any children born to the girl are regarded as the children of
the woman who paid marriage consideration and her husband.95

A review of the various customary marriages indicates that woman-to-woman
marriage is prominent in certain communities in Kenya. There, woman-to-woman
marriage is predominant among the Nandi. It is also celebrated under Kikuyu customary
marriage laws. It has been mentioned that among the Nandi, a female husband should
always be a woman of advanced age who has failed to bear a son.96It has already been
mentioned one essential purpose of the union is to provide an heir. In a claim for
succession, the court found the existence of a woman-to-woman marriage between the
petitioner and the deceased under the Nandi custom and, accordingly, held that the
petitioner was a “wife”, and that by the operative customary law, she and her sons
belonged to the household of the deceased, and were entitled to inheritance right, prior to
anyone else.97 The court, in coming to this conclusion, was satisfied that the necessary
conditions for the existence of a woman-to-woman marriage as it pertained in the Nandi
custom was completed.
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The practice is also stated to be common among the Lovedu tribe in South
Africa.98 However, unlike the institution of woman-to-woman marriage practice among
the Nandi people, Krige has emphasized that the essential feature of woman-to-woman
marriage among the Lovedu tribe is that the institution is not the privilege of those who
have acquired wealth by their own efforts, but the institution is within the reach of any
woman in certain fortuitous circumstance.99 In other words, woman-to-woman marriage
is not practiced among only woman past the age of child bearing and who has no sons.
Circumstances such the need to raise an heir for a political position, woman-to-woman
marriage as an investment of wealth earned by women, arrangements in case of
barrenness, and the queen's wives are some of the instances that may call for a woman-towoman marriage.100However, in many cases, the need for woman-to-woman marriage is
for the wife to bear children for the female husband.101This is achieved by the barren
woman marrying another woman for the husband. Cadigan has also mentioned that, the
institution of woman-to-woman-to-woman marriage is a strategy that women use to
further their social and economic position in the society.102
In Nigeria, a court has ruled that where there is proof that a custom permits
marriage of a woman to another woman, such custom must be regarded as repugnant by
virtue of the proviso to the section 14(3) of the Evidence Act, and ought not to be upheld
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by the court.103 The court used the woman-to-woman marriage here to refer to “womanto-woman” marriage analogous to lesbianism. However, in the opinion of the court,
where a “woman-to-woman” marriage is not a marriage between two women, rather, one
woman, due to the fact that she was barren, had procured another woman for her husband
as a wife, such arrangement is not caught by the proviso to section 14(3), and is not
contrary to public policy.104
The position taken by the Nigerian court clearly differentiates woman-to-woman
marriage, as practiced in some African countries, from lesbianism. It is apparent from the
court’s decision that the absence of sexual satisfaction in woman-to woman marriage is a
key consideration in holding the union valid. Where the union is akin to lesbianism the
court may find such a relationship contrary to the system of jurisprudence practiced in
most African countries.105In this case, the court accepted as a valid custom that if a
woman has no issue she can marry another woman for her husband; any issue from the
said married woman would be regarded as an issue from the woman who married her for
the purpose of representation in respect of estates and inheritance.106
Notwithstanding the foregoing account of woman-to-woman marriage under these
customs, the institution of woman-to-woman marriage has not been given the attention it
warrants and is still not entirely understood.107 It is arguable whether “foreigners” are
entitled to enter into such a marriage. Essentially, the marriage must meet the
103

Eugene Meribe v. Joshua C Egwu, [1976] 1 NLR [Part 1] 266.
Ibid.
105
For a robust critique of this decision see C. O. Akpamgbo, “A ‘Woman to Woman’ Marriage and the
Repugnancy Clause: A Case of Putting New Wine into Old Bottles” (1977) 9:14 The Journal of Legal
Pluralism and Unofficial Law 87.
106
Ibid at 89.
107
Krige, supra note 99.
104

33

requirements of the customs and practices of the particular community for it to be valid.
In Eliud Maina Mwangi v Margaret Wanjiru Gachangi,108 the Court of Appeal in Nairobi
overturned the decision of the High Court which held that the respondent was the wife of
the deceased. In the opinion of the court, the marriage did not satisfy the essential
requirements of the Kikuyu customary law under which the marriage was purported to
have been celebrated. In Millicent Njeri Mbugua v Alice Wambui Wainaina, Hon. M.S.A.
Makhandia, J observed that for a woman-to-woman marriage to be valid, the husband of
the woman marrying another must have died; the woman marrying must have been left
childless by her deceased husband; she must be past child bearing; the said woman or
widow must pay ruracio to the family of the woman she is marrying; and she must
subsequently arrange for a man from her deceased husband’s age group to have
intercourse with her wife.109
The concept of woman-to-woman marriage seems to suggest that the idea of
same-sex marriage may not be entirely new, at least, to some African countries. Its
semblance to lesbianism is well illustrated where a female takes another female as her
“wife” and performs all the necessary customary rights and ceremonies associated with a
valid marriage in her community. The significant difference maybe the absence of sexual
relations for the two women concerned in woman-to-woman marriage. However, given
the limited information on woman-to-woman marriage in Africa, its place in the
customary marriage setting is uncertain. It appears to be limited to only certain tribes, so
it is debatable whether a foreigner can enter into such a marriage, in Kenya, for example.
It is, however, evident that the practice is recognized and accepted in jurisdictions like
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South Africa and Kenya. The question is how these relationships will be recognized by
other African countries.
Supposing a Ghanaian goes through a woman-to-woman marriage with her
partner in Kenya, what would be the Ghanaian courts’ reaction to such a union? Can a
woman married under such a custom be charged with bigamy if, while the woman-towoman marriage subsists, she subsequently contracts another marriage in Ghana? Is one
to accept that once the marriage is valid under Kenyan law, being the place of celebration
of the marriage, then the marriage should be recognized? These may be difficult
arguments to settle, given that Ghana does not explicitly bar woman-to-woman marriage.
However, from a conflict of law perspective, it seems jurisdictions where such
relationships are not domestically recognized may refuse recognition on grounds of
public policy. That is, the marriage is not recognized by the lex fori. In Ghana, for
example, marriage, whether customary marriage, civil, or Mohammedan, is viewed from
a heterosexual perspective.110 It is debatable whether Ghana will apply the same conflict
of laws rules, the lex loci celebrationis and the lex domicilii, to recognize a woman-towoman marriage celebrated in another country. In essence, a woman-to-woman marriage
considered valid under the laws of the place where it was celebrated may still not be
recognized in jurisdictions where woman-to-woman marriage is not domestically
regulated. But where the non-recognition of such marriage will cause injustice, the court
may base upon on public policy and natural justice to recognize it.111
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It may be mentioned that jurisdictions like South Africa and Kenya112 may
recognize such relationships from other countries, given that woman-to-woman marriage
is domestically recognized under the customary laws of these states. This position
explains that where a union is domestically recognized by the forum country, the courts
are not reluctant to grant recognition to similar unions from other countries. However, a
conflict of laws problem arises when the state within which a remedy is sought does not
have laws regulating such relationships.

5. Conclusion
The institution of marriage in Africa is diversely practiced among the African countries.
While the civil/statutory marriage is common among most English-speaking African
countries and seems regulated along the English understanding of marriage, the extent of
recognition and regulation of other domestic unions, such as marriage between relatives,
Muslim marriage, polygamy and woman-to-woman marriage, differ from one country to
another. This raises a private international law issue as to how such unions not
domestically recognized in a host country will be treated in that jurisdiction. However,
the fact that the marriage is between a man and a woman is critical and may be enough
ground for the host country to recognize such unions where the essential and the formal
requirements of the marriage are satisfied. As evident from the discussion, with the
exception of woman-to-woman marriage which contemplates a union between two
women, all other domestic unions have a heterosexual character and, accordingly,
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envisage a relationship between a man and a woman. It is debatable whether the same
recognition would be given to unions that are between the same genders.
The next chapter examines how same-sex marriage and other domestic unions that are
prohibited and not domestically recognized in Canada and the UK are treated from a
conflict of law perspective. The discussion serves as the springboard and a comparative
lens for examining how the conflict of laws aspects of such unions are or would be
treated in Africa in Chapter Four.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ASPECTS OF NON-TRADITIONAL
MARRIAGE IN CANADA AND THE UK
1. Introduction
Canada and the United Kingdom are among the few countries that recognize
same-sex marriage under their legislation. This is significant, given that studies have
shown limited support for the recognition of such unions in many jurisdictions. In
Canada, the Civil Marriage Act,113 grants legal status to same-sex couples who marry
under the Act. The same can be said about UK. Its Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act,
2013,114 legalises same-sex marriage celebrated in the UK.
Same-sex marriage in these two countries now has the same legal status as
heterosexual marriage. This has placed same-sex and heterosexual couples in the same
position in both jurisdictions. In addition to the recognition of same-sex unions, these two
countries have moved from the position of blanket non-recognition of other “nontraditional” forms of marriage to granting recognition in specific instances. Hitherto, both
Canada and UK were characterised by a total rejection of the idea of polygamy and other
relationships falling under the marriage prohibited degrees; a rejection based on the
impossibility of such unions being considered as marriage in both jurisdictions. However,
there is a growing benevolence of the English and Canadian courts toward the
recognition of polygamous marriages and other forms of domestic unions.
This chapter explores how private international law issues generated by same-sex
marriage and other ‘non-traditional’ foreign marriages are addressed in UK and Canada.
Both countries are common law jurisdictions, and legislation and case law, especially in
113
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the UK, have very strong persuasive weight in English-speaking African countries. The
goal is to examine how the private international law issues generated by these unions are
resolved, the various ways of resolving them and the extent to which the approaches in
these two countries may be useful to English-speaking African countries which are facing
similar situations.
The chapter is divided into 3 sections. Section 1 examines the recognition of nontraditional forms of marriage in UK and Canada before the Marriage (Same-sex Couples)
Act and Civil Marriage Act. This will provide a general overview of what had hitherto
been the definition of marriage in these two jurisdictions and how the courts have dealt
with the recognition of foreign unions that are not domestically recognized in the two
countries. Section 2 and 3, respectively, examines the approaches adopted by Canada and
UK to resolve the conflict of laws issues which arise from same-sex marriage. This will
form a basis for the recommendations of approaches that may be useful to Englishspeaking African countries where same-sex marriage is not legally recognized.

2. Recognition of “Non Traditional Marriage” in Canada and UK: A Conflict
of Laws Perspective
The institution of marriage is fundamental to the legal system of many countries.
In Canada, legislative jurisdiction over marriage and divorce is shared by the federal and
the provincial government. This is different from the practice in the United Kingdom
where legislative authority over contracting and the incidents of marriage is unitarily
regulated by the central government. In Canada, section 91(22) of the Constitution Act,
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1867115 vests exclusive right in the Parliament of Canada in all matters relating to
marriage and divorce. The provinces have legislative jurisdiction over the solemnisation
of marriage.116 This distribution means that the essential requirements of marriage
relating to capacity to marry is in the domain of the federal government, while matters
considered under the formal requirements are regulated under provincial legislation.117
However, while provincial governments cannot legislate on capacity, the courts have
interpreted the provincial solemnisation jurisdiction to include regulating the minimum
age for the issuance of a marriage license or solemnisation in the provinces. 118 In
circumstances where there is conflict between valid federal and valid provincial
legislation, the principle has been that federal legislation takes priority and supersedes
provincial legislation.119 But in the area of divorce, federal legislation has been applied
uniformly throughout the country.120 In addition, the courts have extended the federal
divorce power to include child, spousal support and custody issues ancillary to divorce.121
In the UK, marriage is unitarily regulated under the general laws of the country.
That is, both the essential and formal requirements of marriage are regulated under the a
unitary system. Before the enactment of the Civil Marriage Act and the Marriage (Samesex Couples) Act, both Canada and UK considered marriage as the voluntary union for
life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.122 This was in tandem with
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the common law definition of marriage given in Hyde v. Hyde.123 In this case, Lord
Penzance emphasized the heterosexual character of marriage and also the fact that any
institution that acts contrary to the “one man, one woman” rule was in fact not a marriage
in the Christian sense. In both Canada and UK, this preposition has been applied to
domestic marriages and also to the recognition of foreign marriages.124
It is trite that states have the right to determine what will happen within their
borders. This sovereign right includes matters relating to the legal recognition of
marriages. The validity of marriages celebrated in a country is determined under the laws
of that country, including its private international law. In general, recognition of marriage
celebrated domestically by individuals domiciled in the forum country are rarely matters
of contention before domestic courts. The marriage must meet both the formal and
essential requirements of the family law of the particular state for it to be valid. 125 In both
Canada and the UK, domestic relationships, like polygamy, incest and relationships
falling under the prohibited degrees, have long been prohibited126 under various rules,
and any purported marriage in violation of these prohibitions was considered void and of
no legal effect.
Although there seems to be no contention in regard to the validity of marriages
which are domestically celebrated, the case is different with recognition of foreign
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marriages. In this case the courts give effects to status or legal obligations created by a
foreign marriage. In general, the conflict of laws approach to the recognition of marriage
in both Canada and the UK have been that in order for a foreign marriage to be
recognized, the marriage must satisfy both the formal requirement of the place where the
marriage was celebrated, and the essential requirement of the laws of the domicile of the
parties involved.127 The lex loci celebrationis is applied to determine whether the
marriage is formally valid, and the lex domicilii is applied to determine whether the
parties had the capacity to marry under the laws of their respective pre-nuptial domicile.
In essence, a marriage valid under the respective domiciles of the parties and the place of
celebration will be recognized as valid in the forum country. However, strict application
of the rule has mainly been in respect to marriages falling under the traditional definition
of marriage set out in Hyde v. Hyde, namely, that in addition to the marriage meeting the
essential and formal requirements of the respective pre-nuptial domicile of the respective
parties, it must be between a man and a woman and must be monogamous. In addition,
the marriage must not fall within any of the degrees of consanguinity and affinity
prohibiting marriage.
In both Canada and UK, different approaches were used when the marriage under
consideration fell outside the traditional definition of marriage established in Hyde v.
Hyde.128
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2.1 Canada’s Approach to the Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriage
Canada has historically adopted different approaches towards the recognition of
non-traditional marriages. Canadian courts, for instance, routinely applied the lex loci
celebrationis and the lex domicilii to traditional marriages of one man and one woman.
However, they were reluctant to adopt the same approach in to recognize polygamous
marriages,129 that is, Canadian courts refused to recognise a polygamous marriage even
when it had been validly contracted under both the lex loci celebrationis and the lex
domicilii rules.130 In Lim v Lim,131 a Chinese domiciled in China entered into a
polygamous marriage with two women. The marriage was legal under Chinese law. The
man subsequently immigrated with the second wife to Canada. In an application for
maintenance by the second wife upon the husband’s desertion, the court declined
jurisdiction on the basis that neither party in a polygamous marriage was entitled to a
relief from a Canadian court. Essentially, the marriage was not recognized by the laws of
Canada.132
It is debatable whether Lim v Lim was a good decision even at the time it was
made. Before that decision, the British Columbia court in Yew v Attorney General of
British Columbia133 had, on similar facts, recognized two wives of polygamous marriages
as wives for all purposes of the Succession Duty Act. Although Coady J. in Lim referred
to Yew, he recognized that the Yew case only accepted that it was the status enjoyed by
both wives of the deceased resident in China that’s must be recognized by the British
129
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Columbia Courts in the disposition of his estate. However, the judge concluded that he
was bound by Hyde v Hyde and, accordingly, refused to recognize the marriage. It is
evident the unjust result that flowed when the rule in Hyde v Hyde is followed in all its
strictness. Essentially, the wife to a foreign marriage is refused the right to enforce a
remedy to which, under Canadian law a wife is entitled by reason of the marriage
contract.134
The legislative attitude was not only to proscribe polygamous marriage but to
make it a crime for any person who enters into it. Although the criminal sanction applies
to individuals domiciled in Canada, it made it difficult for the court to recognize as valid
a foreign union which is criminalized in the jurisdiction.135
The rule of blanket non-recognition was criticized, but the non-recognition of
such marriages was defended on public policy grounds, and also on the grounds that such
marriages were not recognized according to the lex fori.136 Essentially, such marriages
would not have been valid if celebrated in Canada. This led to the limping marriage
phenomenon where marriages validly accepted in the parties’ domicile were not
recognized as valid in Canada, leaving a party with no relief.137 Blanket non-recognition
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of other domestic unions like incest was also defended on the same public policy
grounds.

2.2 UK’s Approach to the Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriage
UK has long refused recognition of foreign domestic unions falling outside the
definition of marriage established in Hyde. Subsequent to Hyde, the English court in Re
Bethell138 refused to recognize a marriage celebrated in South Africa under the Baralong
custom between a man domiciled in the UK and a member of the Baralong tribe.
Baralong custom allows polygamy. The traditional conflict of laws position in English
law was that a marriage that is good by the law of one country must be held good in all
others where the question of its validity arises. However, this position was applicable
only to marriages falling under the rule in Hyde v Hyde.139 In Re Bethell, it was reasoned
no marriage existed and the rule could not be applied. In essence, the court gave effect to
the preposition by Lord Penzance in Hyde that the union was in fact not a marriage in the
Christian sense and, therefore, refused to recognise it.140

The judgment in Re Bethell represents the distinction between Christian marriage
and other unions. In essence, the status created by the union was not the status of a
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married person not a husband or wife. Although the decision may be criticised for the fact
that it failed to recognize a status validly conferred on the parties by a foreign law, a strict
application of the lex domicile rule supports the court’s decision. Under English law, the
man did not have the capacity to enter into the polygamous marriage.

In matrimonial cases, the English courts declined jurisdiction to dissolve even a
potentially polygamous marriage where the parties were subject to foreign law. In Sowa
v. Sowa,141 the court declined jurisdiction in a suit for separation and maintenance. Before
assuming jurisdiction in any matrimonial case the first issue for consideration was
whether the marriage falls under the principles established in Hyde v. Hyde.142 In Sowa,
the court declined to consider whether the husband had a duty to maintain his "wife" and
infant child on the basis that the marriage was celebrated under a polygamous law in
Ghana. In essence, the court viewed the issue of maintenance of the dependents as
necessarily geared to and dependent on jurisdiction in matrimonial causes.

2.3 Trend towards the recognition of non-traditional marriages in Canada and
UK
The position of non-recognition of certain marriages in both the UK and Canada
resulted in unfair and unjust outcome. In some cases, a spouse to a foreign marriage is
left without a remedy and may be tied to a relationship which existed only by name.
However, later judicial decisions in both jurisdictions gave indication that the previous
position of total non-recognition of certain marriages may be less strictly applied. The
141
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attitude towards polygamy changed considerably. The courts abandoned the strict
application of the monogamous character of marriage and recognised several effects of
such marriages. The context of each case started to profoundly shape the outcome. In
Radwan v. Radwan(No.2)143 Cumming-Bruce J emphasized that

[I]t is an over-simplification of the common law to assume that the
same test … applies to every kind of incapacity, non-age, affinity,
prohibition of monogamous contract by virtue of an existing spouse
and the capacity for polygamy. Different public and social factors are
relevant to each of these.144
Each case was treated on its own merits. In this regard, spouses who had
lawfully contracted a foreign marriage in accordance with their personal law had
the marriage recognized for specific purposes.

In Cheni v. Cheni,145 the court assumed jurisdiction in a marriage celebrated in
Egypt that was not recognized under English domestic law. The parties were within the
prohibited degree of consanguinity-the wife being a niece of the husband. The English
court assumed jurisdiction and upheld the validity of the marriage, though it was against
English policy. In the opinion of Sir Jocelyn Simon, P, the true test in withholding
recognition on the ground of public policy was “whether the marriage is so offensive to
the conscience of the English court that it should refuse to recognize and give effect to
the proper foreign law. In deciding that question, the court will seek to exercise common
sense, good manners, and reasonable tolerance".146 To withhold recognition was to
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disregard the views of many civilised countries by whose laws these marriages are
permissible. These considerations are instructive in deciding whether a valid foreign
marriage should be given recognition. It is also worth mentioning that, from the facts of
the case, the marriage at the time of the suit had become monogamous, and accordingly,
favored the court to assume jurisdiction. The court recognized that the acquisition of an
English domicile of choice changed the character of a potentially polygamous marriage
and gave the English Courts jurisdiction. This differentiated it from Sowa where the
parties’ potential polygamous marriage still subsisted at the time the relief was sought.147

The concept of change in domicile and the acquisition of a new status have been
applied in a number of cases where it is evident that a party is relying on the polygamous
status to defeat a claim. In Haussain v Haussain,148 the husband tried to rely on the
polygamous nature of his marriage to defeat the wife’s claim for a decree of judicial
separation. He denied that he was married under English law since her marriage was
potentially polygamous under Pakistan law – the place of celebration of the marriage.
The Court, however, found that the acquisition of English domiciliary changed the
marriage into a monogamous one.

A review of the cases illustrates some degree of inconsistency in the decisions of
the courts. This is because the courts seem to apply different conflict of laws rules in the
recognition/non-recognition of foreign marriages. In one breath, the court seems to rely
on the pre-nuptial domicile of the parties to assume jurisdiction, while in another, the
147
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court declines jurisdiction on the basis that the marriage was potentially polygamous
under the laws of the place of celebration. This created uncertainty as to when an English
court may recognize a foreign marriage falling outside the traditional definition of
marriage.

The cases above illustrate a departure by English courts towards a benevolent
approach to the recognition of other forms of union that were not domestically
recognized in the UK. It is not certain what accounted for the change in judicial attitude
except for Esplugues’s view that the shift in attitude was justified by the important
process of migration in England.149 He also mentioned that receptivity to polygamy was a
consequence of the same alteration in the concepts of morality that society shares, and the
modification of the role that family and marriage play in it. 150 Essentially, there was a
change in attitude as to what traditionally have been considered marriage under English
law. In Esplugues’s opinion, it was not possible to deny recognition to polygamous
marriages when "de facto unions" were allowed effect for certain purposes.151 It is also
evident from the cases that the English courts departed from blanket non-recognition of
certain domestic unions towards the characterization of such unions. The subtle
distinction between matrimonial causes and other matters enabled the court, to decide
whether to grant relief in particular cases. This does not mean that these prohibited
unions have become legally respectable in England. It is simply that the courts extend

149

Esplugues supports his assertion with the fact that England has a fairly large resident Asian community
whose personal laws recognize polygamy. In addition, it was not possible to deny recognition to
polygamous marriages when "de facto unions" were allowed effects for certain purposes. See Esplugues,
supra note 27 at 306.
150
Supra note 27.
151
Supra note 27at 306.

49

recognition to deal with specific claims involved.152 Essentially, the courts distinguished
between the validity of a marriage and its effects. This way, they were able to give effect
to incidents of some domestic unions which were not domestically recognized, although
the recognition did not modify the monogamous character of marriage in England.

It is also worth mentioning that before the decision in Haussain, parliament had
granted jurisdiction to English courts to adjudicate cases of polygamy, putting to rest the
issue whether an English court could exercise jurisdiction in a polygamous marriage.
This was regulated under the Matrimonial Proceedings (Polygamous Marriages) Act,
1972.153 Under the Act, a court in England was not to be precluded from granting
matrimonial relief or making a declaration concerning the validity of a marriage by
reason that the marriage in question was entered into under a law which permits
polygamy.154 Essentially, the Act permitted courts in the United Kingdom to grant
matrimonial relief in respect to polygamous marriages.155 The Act, however, did not
grant recognition to domestic polygamous relationships celebrated in the UK.156 A party
domiciled in the UK cannot enter into a polygamous marriage even if the marriage is
contracted outside. Such marriage is void and has no legal effect in the UK. Thus, UK
domiciliaries could not take advantage of the Act to contract a valid polygamous
marriage outside the UK. Essentially, the Act represented legislative benevolence
towards the recognition of polygamous marriages celebrated by foreign individuals.
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From a conflict of laws perspective, the approach to the recognition of foreign
domestic unions in the UK is not significantly different from that of Canada. However, in
Canada, the courts, compared with Parliament, seem to be more benevolent to the
recognition of polygamy.157 The courts look into the facts of each case to ascertain
whether a particular remedy should be applied.158

At present, Canada seems to apply the same recognition test for traditional
marriages as for non-traditional foreign marriages. If parties had the capacity to marry
under their respective domiciles, the marriage would typically be recognized in Canada
even if the celebration of such a marriage would not be permitted in Canada.159 A
polygamous marriage valid under both the lex loci celebrations and the lex domicilii
principles will be recognized as valid. It is not certain what the basis for the change in
position is, but it seems the courts have recognized the injustice that may occur from
blanket non-recognition. In Azam v Jan, the court acknowledged that in the interest of
public policy, it should take jurisdiction over valid and invalid foreign polygamous
marriages. In the decision of the court, the Hyde decision of 1866 is outdated and no
longer reflects Canadian realities.160This indicates a progressive realization by the court
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that blanket non-recognition of some foreign unions would leave parties without
recourse, and this would invariably exclude some immigrant families from rights
accorded to other Canadians in their marriages. Bailey, for example, has suggested that
women in foreign polygamous marriages are likely to suffer if the remedies of divorce
and annulment are not available to them.161
In Azam, the court exercised jurisdiction over a foreign polygamous marriage by
acknowledging the marriage for the limited purpose of providing an adequate remedy,
although the court was satisfied that whatever its foreign legality, it is invalid in
Canada.162 In granting an order of annulment, the court observed that the purported
marriage between the applicant and the respondent was void ab initio since the marriage
did not satisfy the essential requirement relating to the capacity of the man entering into
another marriage.163 Despite the fact that the marriage was valid under the lex loci
celebrationis rule, the man being a Canadian domicile, lacked the capacity to enter into
another marriage while his first marriage subsisted. This position taken by the court
endorsed the traditional conflict of laws approach to the recognition of foreign marriages
in Canada, that the marriage must be both formally and essentially valid. In this case, the
marriage was valid under Pakistan law where it was celebrated, but void under Canadian
law where the man was domiciled. It must also be mentioned that, the court would have
come to the same conclusion if it had applied the pre-nuptial rule, since Mr. Jan lacked
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the legal capacity in Canada for his subsequent marriage by virtue of his previous
subsisting marriage.164
It is still debatable whether a Canadian court can statutorily exercise divorce
jurisdiction over a foreign polygamous marriage. Some have suggested that the definition
of “spouse” under the Divorce Act,165 precludes its application to valid foreign
polygamous marriages (“spouse” means either of two persons who are married to each
other).166 However, Bielby J.A has emphasized that the definition of “spouse” in s. 2(1)
of the Divorce Act arguably does not compel the conclusion that polygamous marriages
are not recognized. In his opinion, the section may merely indicate that the two (and only
two) parties to the litigation must be the parties to the marriage even though one of them
may also be a party to another marriage.167
In addition to the courts exercising jurisdiction over foreign polygamous
marriages, the courts now recognize the validity of foreign polygamous marriages for
other specific purposes, such as inheritance. In Tse v. Minister of Employment and
Immigration,168 Urie J.A. stated that polygamous marriages valid in the country where
they were entered into and where the parties were domiciled would be recognized as
valid by Canadian Courts. However, the recognition does not confer on such relationships
all the rights associated with monogamous marriage in Canada. In Yew v. AttorneyGeneral of British Columbia, the court recognized both wives of a polygamous marriage
as wives for the purpose of succession; this was however a limited recognition.169 In
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Bolentiru v Radulescu,170the Ontario Superior Court granted a decree of annulment in
respect of a marriage celebrated in Bucharest, Romania, between the plaintiff and the
defendant. The court found that the defendant was already in a validly subsisting
marriage at the time that he and the plaintiff were married. The court further granted the
plaintiff compensatory and general damages for work done by the plaintiff and for false
representation of the defendant.
Thus, Canadian courts are now ready to grant ancillary relief even where a
polygamous marriage has been held void. In addition to judicial intervention, some
provincial legislation also extend aspects of relief to parties in an actively polygamous
marriage. For example, the Alberta Family Law Act171 provides an adult interdependent
partner support.172 In Ontario, a person in a polygamous marriage is considered a
“spouse” and may claim matrimonial relief if the marriage was celebrated in a
jurisdiction that recognizes it as valid.173 In Hicks v Gallardo, the Ontario Court of
Appeal interpreted section 1 of the Ontario Family Law Act to include parties who have
undergone a marriage ceremony or event in good faith but did not have the capacity to
enter into the marriage (e.g. by reason of prohibited degrees of consanguinity), and
parties to a voidable marriage, as well as spouses to a polygamous marriage if the
marriage was celebrated in a jurisdiction that recognizes such unions as legally valid.174
These decisions clearly represent a shift from the previous position of blanket nonrecognition to a more benevolent approach.
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In recognizing polygamous marriage, Canadian courts have emphasized that a
potentially polygamous marriage could be converted into a monogamous marriage if the
parties actually live monogamously and changed their domicile to a country where
polygamy is outlawed.175 In Sara v Sara,176 a potentially polygamous marriage celebrated
between nationals of India was held to be converted to a monogamous marriage.
Although the court acknowledged that the marriage under Indian law was potentially
polygamous, it reasoned that by virtue of the change in domicile to Canada, the parties
had abandoned their polygamous status. The position taken by the courts in Sara reflects
upon the fact that the parties although in a potentially polygamous marriage, had lived a
monogamous life. It is debatable whether the same conclusion would have been reached
if after change in domicile, the husband was still in a polygamous union. It is not always
the case that a change in domicile may affect the status of a party. In Azam v. Jan, the
court found that although the husband acquired domicile in Canada, he was still in a
polygamous marriage. Mr. Jan remained in his marriage with another woman and
continued to reside with her and his child while his purported marriage with Ms. Azam
subsisted.
It is debatable whether marriages falling under the prohibited degree may also be
accorded some recognition. Canadian family law policy has been against unions between
a man, his sister, mother and daughter. Almost certainly the blanket non-recognition of
these unions may still be upheld on grounds of public policy.177
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It is also worth mentioning that the giving of legal recognition to “void
marriages” is not endemic only to the UK and Canada. In Africa, the courts have long
developed exceptions to the common law rule that a void marriage has no legal
consequences.178 For example, the South African law of putative marriage refers to the
specific instances where a void marriage is visited with limited legal consequences
despite its invalidity.179 It is trite that a subsisting civil marriage constitutes a bar to any
of the parties to the marriage entering into another marriage while the civil marriage had
not been dissolved. Any purported second marriage is consequently bigamous and of no
legal effect.180 Bigamy is thus a ground for absolute nullity of the second marriage.
However, the rationale behind the concept of putative marriage is to mitigate the
harshness of blanket non-recognition of such a marriage to one spouse, and more
particularly, to mitigate the harsh effects non-recognition will have on the children born
of the union.181 These issues mostly arise in property distribution and inheritance.
Essentially, the putative marriage concept allows the putative spouse limited rights as a
lawful spouse, with the result that upon divorce or the death intestate of one spouse, the
other acquires a portion of the deceased spouse’s estate on the basis of the principle of
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equity.182 The concept allows the bona fide spouse to enforce his or her rights of property
to which he or she would have been entitled had the marriage been valid. In the case of
intestacy, Hahlo has asserted that the wife in good faith succeeds to his partner if the
latter dies intestate.183 In Mograbi v Mograbi,184 the parties went through a form of
marriage which they both thought was binding, but which was legally invalid. The court
awarded the plaintiff a share of the estate on the evidence that the plaintiff contributed to
the acquisition of the estate. Without this benevolent approach, the putative wife may be
without a remedy.185
In addition to judicial interventions catering to the interest of the putative spouse,
African courts give legal recognition to children born out of wedlock or within void
marriages. Historically, legitimacy was very significant for purposes of succession and
inheritance. Hitherto, children born out of wedlock or outside a valid subsisting marriage
were considered illegitimate and not entitled to share in the “father’s” estate. The
common law rule stated by Heathcote A.J was that “those who are born of a union which
is entirely odious, and therefore prohibited shall not be called natural children and no
indulgence whatever shall be extended to them”.186 Accordingly, such children could not
inherit intestate from their fathers. In the Ghana case of Coleman v Shang,187 the
deceased first married a woman (Adeline) according to native custom and had children
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by her. He later divorced Adeline and married the plaintiff’s mother (Wilhelmina) under
the Marriage Ordinance and had five children by her of whom the plaintiff was the sole
survivor. While the marriage with Wilhelmina was still subsisting, the deceased lived and
cohabited with the defendant and had 10 children by her. The relationship with the
defendant was consequently adulterous and unlawful under the existing law. Upon the
death intestate of the deceased, the issue inter alia, was whether the 10 children born
during the subsistence of the marriage under the Marriage Ordinance could share in the
estate of the father.
The court held that the ten children were illegitimate and not entitled to share in
the deceased’s estate. The court affirmed the rule that an extra-marital child was not
recognized as having any legal relationship with his or her father but only with his or her
mother.188

The decision in Coleman can be criticized as harsh and contrary to the principles
of justice. Essentially, the sins of the father who committed the adultery was inflicted
upon the children. To deny the children a share in the estate of the father by reason of the
illegitimate relationship between their mother and the father inflicts on them a burden or
disadvantage which they did not create. This is more so when they did not have the
opportunity to choose their own father. However, as Oppong has rightly argued,at
present, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children has become largely
insignificant – judicial decisions, constitutional and statutory provisions have watered
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down the legal significance of the distinction.189 In the cases of In Re Asante (Decd.);
Asante and Another V. Owusu,190 the Court of Appeal per Essien J.A reiterated the
position that “a child had by a man with whichever woman, she being a concubine or
girlfriend or mistress, once accepted by the man as his child is recognized by law as his
child and this child is entitled to a portion of his estate.”191 This position is supported by
the judgment of Heathcote A.J in Frans v. Paschke where he stated that the rule that an
illegitimate child cannot inherit intestate from his father was discriminatory and
inconsistent with the Namibian constitutional provision that every child shall be known
and cared for by both parents.192 These provisions are meant to cater for children who
will be disadvantaged by the strict application of the common law rule on illegitimacy.
As Hahlo has rightly noted, unlike other areas of the law, there are no
discretionary powers under which the court may declare an invalid marriage to be
valid.193 However, the plausible conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that
courts are ready to extend limited recognition to apparently void unions where to deny
such recognition will lead to great hardship and injustice. In recognizing the rights of
both the putative spouse and the “illegitimate child” to share in the estate of the deceased
spouse and father respectively, the courts did not sanction or warrant the invalid union,
but considered the incidents of inheritance and succession as separate from the marriage.
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3. Conclusion
As far as the “domestic” law is concerned, polygamous marriages celebrated in
England and Canada are void ab initio and would not be recognized. This extends to
polygamous marriages contracted outside jurisdiction by individuals domiciled in Canada
or UK. Attempting to enter into such a marriage could lead to criminal charges in both
jurisdictions. On the contrary, unions which are not recognized within the two
jurisdictions are given recognition when entered into by foreign nationals, although the
recognition may be for specific purposes. The courts by this approach, are able to resolve
some injustices that may occur from blanket non-recognition of such unions. This
approach taken by the UK and Canada is a classic illustration of how states may deal with
the recognition of foreign unions that are not allowed within/under their jurisdictions.
The next section considers the conflict of laws aspect of same-sex marriage in
Canada and the United Kingdom.

4. Recognition of Same-sex Marriage in Canada
4.1 Domestic recognition of same-sex marriage in Canada
The current legislative framework under which same-sex marriage in Canada is
regulated is the Civil Marriage Act.194 The enactment of the Civil Marriage Act follows a
plethora of judicial decisions that invalidated the heterosexual requirement for civil
marriage in Canada. The Act extends the capacity to marry to same-sex couples. It
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includes some consequential amendments to many statutes and a redefinition of the word
“spouse” to mean “either of two persons who are married to each other”.195
For civil purposes, marriage is defined as the lawful union of two persons to the
exclusion of all others.196 This definition is in line with court decisions which said that
the common law definition of marriage was discriminatory against same-sex couples.
Essentially, the Act recognizes the right of same-sex partners to civil marriage. A
marriage is not void or voidable by reason only that the spouses are of the same-sex.197
This places same-sex couples and heterosexual couples in the same legal position in
Canada. Unlike under the previous regime where same-sex couples were granted only the
right to enter into domestic civil partnerships, the Civil Marriage Act grants legal status
to same-sex couples who marry under the Act.
In line with religious concern, about the drafting of the Act, the Civil Marriage
Act acknowledges and recognizes freedom of religion and belief. Religious leaders are
not obligated to celebrate a same-sex marriage if it is against their religious beliefs. There
is no criminal or regulatory sanction for any religious leader who refuses to perform a
same-sex marriage. This issue was considered during the promulgation of the Act.
Religious leaders wanted to be sure that refusal to recognize such unions would not lead
to prosecution. Thus, section 3 of the Act clarifies that “officials of religious groups are
free to refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious
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beliefs”.198 This supports the freedom of conscience and belief guaranteed in the
Canadian Charter.
Section 5 of the Civil Marriage Act settles one area of conflict of laws in respect
to marriages celebrated in Canada by parties who have their respective domicile in
another country. It is provided that
a marriage that is performed in Canada and that would be valid in
Canada if the spouses were domiciled in Canada is valid for the
purposes of Canadian law even though either or both of the spouses do
not at the time of the marriage have the capacity to enter into it under
the law of their respective state of domicile.199
This provision is significant since Canada does not require residency to be an
essential requirement for the celebration of marriage in Canada. The provision makes
Canada a “safe-haven” for many gay and lesbian couples.200 Essentially, gay and lesbian
couples can migrate to Canada with the express purpose of having their marriage
celebrated there. The law recognizes such marriages as valid and there is no requirement
of proof that the parties reside in Canada. The provision raises important conflict of laws
issues in terms of recognition of such marriages by the parties’ respective countries of
domicile. The provision does not address migratory or evasive marriages. 201 It is arguable
whether such marriages may be recognized by the country of domicile of the parties. The
potential of this provision creating absurd results is imminent. Parties who have had their
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marriages celebrated in Canada, may upon returning home find that the marriage is not
recognized. This is the limping marriage phenomenon.
Another debatable provision of the Civil Marriage Act is section 7. Before the
Amendment of the Civil Marriage Act, divorce jurisdiction under the Civil Marriage Act
was regulated under the Divorce Act.202 A court in a province has jurisdiction to hear and
determine a divorce proceeding if either spouse has been ordinarily resident in the
province for at least one year immediately preceding the commencement of the
proceeding.203
Essentially, the Civil Marriage Act made residency a requirement for Canadian
courts to exercise divorce jurisdiction involving both residents and non-residents. In the
context of equality, the provision set up the same regime for both same-sex couples and
heterosexual couples. Also from a private international law perspective, the rule provides
clarity regarding the basis for the exercise of divorce jurisdiction in Canada. However,
the provision had the effect of creating absurd results where non-domiciled and nonresident same-sex couples who had their marriages celebrated in Canada were unable to
obtain divorce in their home countries or elsewhere.204 These are mainly cases where the
laws in the place of their respective domiciles do not recognize same-sex marriages. This
same-sex couple, even though validly married in Canada, could not obtain a divorce in
Canada because they were unable to meet the one-year residency jurisdictional
requirement. They were thus left in a legal limbo: they could not obtain divorce in their
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country of domicile because their marriage was unrecognized, and they could not obtain
divorce in Canada because they did not live in Canada.
In 2012, the government introduced Bill, Bill C-32, the Civil Marriage of NonResidents Act, to amend the divorce regime for non-residents. The bill divided the Act
into two parts and created a section for the “Dissolution of Marriage for Non-Resident
Spouses”. The amendment makes all marriages of non-resident couples that were
performed in Canada valid under Canadian law, therefore allowing these couples to end
their marriage if they cannot get a divorce in their home country. Section 7 of the Act
now provides a new legal process for non-residents who married in Canada to dissolve
their marriage in Canada if they are unable to seek divorce under the law of their home
country because their marriage is not recognized there. The current regime is different
from the one applicable to same and opposite sex spouses residing in Canada which is
governed by the Divorce Act.
Some have argued that this new remedial provision creates more problems than it
solves.205 Just like section 5, the new amendment to section 7 has the potential to create
absurdity from a conflict of laws perspective. It is arguable how the rights and obligations
created under a divorce order in Canada may be recognized by the respective domicile of
the parties. Bornheim, for example, has rightly noted that the two provisions “go too far
because they apply Canadian law even though there is minimal territorial connection with
Canada, thus furthering the problem of limping relationships.206 Several collateral issues
of divorce, especially corollary relief, like the division of the matrimonial property, may
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be difficult to enforce in the country of domicile where the courts refuse jurisdiction. The
end result is to leave the parties with orders which cannot be enforced.
In summary, the Civil Marriage Act has addressed the issue of same-sex marriage
in Canada. Gay and lesbian couples may now legally have the status of marriage
conferred on them with all attendant effects. This has placed same-sex marriage on a
parallel legal footing with heterosexual marriage. However, although the country may not
have problems in respect of same-sex marriages celebrated in Canada by individuals
domiciled in Canada, the non-requirement of residence for the purposes of marriage and
divorce may create some impractical results from a conflict of laws perspective.

4.2 Private International Law Aspects of Same-sex Marriage in Canada
From a conflict of laws perspective, the question whether individuals domiciled in
Canada have capacity to enter into a foreign same-sex marriage and, consequently,
whether such a relationship can be recognized in Canada has been settled by the
recognition of same-sex marriage in Canada. Given the domestic recognition of same-sex
marriage in Canada, individuals domiciled in Canada are able to enter into foreign samesex marriage and this marriage will be recognized in Canada so far as the marriage is
valid as required by the form. This is because Canada applies the lex domicilli to
determine the legality of such marriage, and the lex loci celebrationis in respect to the
form of the marriage.
In terms of same-sex marriage recognition, another aspect in the context of
private international law is the treatment in Canadian courts of same-sex foreign unions
entered into by foreign domiciles. In this case, Canadian courts give effect to status or
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legal obligations created by a foreign same-sex marriage. A case in point is Hicks v
Gallardo. Hicks involved a civil partnership between the appellant, Mr. Gallardo and the
respondent, Mr. Hincks, celebrated in the UK under the Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK).
As a same-sex couple, they were not permitted to marry in the United Kingdom.207 The
civil partnership regime then in existence operated as a separate but equal system
exclusive to same-sex couples and was the legal equivalent of marriage under UK law.
The couple, after the civil union, moved to Ontario where they lived for a year before
they separated. The respondent later brought an application in the Superior Court of
Ontario seeking divorce and other relief pursuant to the provisions of the Divorce Act,208
and the Family Law Act.209 The issue, inter alia, was whether the parties were considered
to be spouses under the Divorce Act210 and the Family Law Act. In other words, whether
the court can recognize the parties as spouse in terms of the Divorce Act and the Family
Law Act. The Superior Court agreed with the conclusion of the trial court that the parties
were “spouses” as defined by the Divorce Act and s. 1 of the Family Law Act.
The court placed emphasis on section 1 of the Family Law Act which makes
provision, among others, for parties to relationships that are both formally and
functionally equivalent to marriage. Essentially, the UK Civil Partnership Act provided a
legal regime for same-sex couples equivalent to marriage. The Court reasoned that any
other interpretation of the legislation would result in an anomalous situation where parties
to marriages that are not legal in Canada, such as polygamous marriages, can be
considered spouses but parties to same-sex marriages, which are legal in Canada, cannot
207
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be considered spouses. In essence, the court was ready to grant the parties relief under the
Divorce Act and Family Law Act, although on a strict interpretation of the legislation, the
parties’ civil partnership was not marriage. The decision in Hincks illustrates the fact that
the court was prepared to characterize the relationship as equivalent to a marriage under
Ontario law, the lex fori. Essentially, the requirement is for the court to be satisfied that
the marriage/union is formally recognized under the laws of the place of celebration. The
objective is to treat couples who have lawfully entered into same-sex marriage or
marriage-like relationships in other states as the equivalent of being married in Canada.
In this case, the civil partnership was valid under the UK Civil Partnership Act.
Given the domestic recognition of same-sex marriage in Canada, it is suggested
that Canadian courts will recognize the validity of same-sex marriage or legally
recognized registered partnerships that are entered into in other jurisdictions if the
relationship certifies both the lex celebrationis and the lex domicilii rule.211 This avoids
the “limping marriage” effect where same-sex marriage recognized in one jurisdiction
may not be recognized in other jurisdictions. It must, however, be mentioned that the
strict application of the lex domicilii and the lex loci celebrationis rules may prevent
parties from having capacity to contract a valid same-sex marriage or may be an obstacle
to a recognition of this marriage. However, the Canadian courts have recognized samesex marriage even where the parties lack the capacity to enter into such a marriage under
their respective domicile.
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The case of V & L v. Attorney General of Canada212 illustrates the potential
absurdity that may occur from a strict application of the traditional conflict of laws rules
relating to marriage, and how Canadian courts have resolved the apparent absurdity that
may occur from the strict application of the lex domicilii principle. A lesbian couple, one
domiciled in England and the other domiciled in Florida, married in Canada in 2005 and
separated in 2009. At the time of their marriage, neither had the capacity to enter into the
same-sex marriage because England and Florida did not recognize same-sex marriage at
the time. The issue brought to the court was whether a Canadian court had jurisdiction in
an application for divorce. The Attorney General of Canada argued, inter alia, that the
Superior Court of Ontario did not have jurisdiction to grant the applicants divorce
because under principles of private international law which is respected in Canada, the
applicants were not legally married under Canadian Law. In essence, the status of being
married is a requirement for divorce. Since at the time of the marriage, the parties lacked
the capacity to get married, the marriage was void and a divorce was impossible.213 From
a private international law perspective the Attorney general correctly stated the traditional
conflict of laws position in Canada that for a marriage to be legally valid under Canadian
law, the parties must satisfy both the requirements of the law of the place where the
marriage is celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis) with regard to the formal requirements
and the requirement of the law of domicile of the couple with regard to their legal
capacity to marry one another. In this case neither party had the legal capacity to marry a
person of the same-sex under their respective domicile Florida and England.
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The court, however, granted the applicants a constitutional exemption to allow the
applicant a divorce in Canada. In coming to this decision, the court acknowledged that
the willingness of the Canadian government to grant the Joint Applicants' marriage but to
deny them any access to a legal divorce leaves them entirely without recourse. In the
opinion of the Court, it was legally and procedurally unfair for a government to grant the
right to marry, to perform such marriages and to then leave the Joint Applicants with
absolutely no remedy.
Essentially, the court in the V & L case appreciated the traditional conflict of laws
position in Canada but found that the strict application of the rule will be unfair in the
context of the applicants’ case. Although England will not grant L divorce, her marriage
to V prevented her from entering into a civil partnership in England. A strict application
of the conflict of laws rule would mean that V &L would continue to live under a
relationship which has evidently broken down beyond reconciliation. Given the current
legislation on the dissolution of marriage for non-resident spouses, Canada has again
solved a potential conflict of laws issue that may arise from same-sex marriages
celebrated in Canada by non-resident individuals.
An equally important aspect of the recognition of same-sex marriage is the issue
of inheritance and recognition of foreign adoption orders. The next two sections consider
the conflict of laws aspect relating to inheritance and adoption in a same-sex relationship
context.
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4.3 Inheritance/Succession
A conflict of laws issue which arises in same-sex marriage is succession. Does a
surviving partner have the right to inherit the estate of a partner who is deceased? In most
jurisdictions, succession is based on the concept of family. In general, under Canadian
laws, marriage or adoption may create this formal legal link.214 Given the domestic
recognition of same-sex marriage in Canada, a surviving same-sex spouse will be entitled
to inherit his/her deceased spouse’s estate upon the latter dying intestate. This places
same-sex couples in the same position with heterosexual couples. The issue is whether
the same recognition will be given to a foreign same-sex surviving spouse. In general,
where a marital relationship is established, the court will recognize the right of the
surviving same-sex spouse to inherit the estate of his/her deceased spouse. A state that
recognizes the spousal rights of a same-sex couple will invariably give recognition to
similar rights or benefits from other states or countries.

215

Essentially, proof of the

existence of the relationship by the surviving spouse will entitle the surviving spouse to
inherit the estate of the deceased.216

4.4 Adoption
One issue of intestacy is the right of an adopted child to inherit his/her adoptive
parents’ properties. This issue has become necessary because of the structural changes in
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the concept of family.217 What rights, if any, does an adopted child have over his/her
deceased same-sex parents’ properties? In Canada, adoption and child welfare fall under
provincial jurisdiction. Each province has its own laws and regulations. In Nova Scotia,
for instance, a person may adopt a person younger than the adopter.218 In British
Columbia, an adult or two adults jointly may apply to the court to adopt a child.219 In
general, same-sex couples are entitled to apply for an adoption order under both federal
and provincial legislations. Statutes that previously denied same-sex couples the right of
adoption of a child have been declared unconstitutional.220 This helps same-sex couples
to create family unions that include children either from a pre-existing heterosexual
relationship, or children born during the same-sex relationship. This indicates a
significant change in the concept of family which has hitherto been premised on affinity
and consanguinity.221
An adoption order has the effect of permanently severing the ties of the adopted
child from his/her biological parents and placing new rights and responsibilities onto the
adoptive parents.222 In essence, unless expressly provided, the adopted child cannot
inherit from his/her biological parents upon their death intestate. The adopted person
becomes the child of the adoptive parents and the adoptive parents become the parents of
the adopted child, as if the adopted child had been born in lawful wedlock to the adoptive
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parents.223 This creates a new set of rights in the adopted child vis-a-vis his/her adoptive
parents. These include the right of the adopted child to inherit his/her adoptive parents’
properties. Under the Nova Scotia Children and Family Services Act, for example, in any
enactment, conveyance, trust, settlement, devise, bequest or other instrument, "child" or
"issue" or the equivalent of either includes an adopted child.224 Thus unless the contrary
is stated, a reference to a person described in terms of their relationship by blood to
another person includes an adopted child. This places the adopted child in the same
position as any biological child born to the adoptive parents.
From a conflict of laws perspective, the fact that Canada does not discriminate
between heterosexual and homosexual adoption is significant for the purposes of
succession. Can a foreign adopted child inherit from his or her same-sex adoptive
parents? Given the domestic recognition of the rights of the adopted child of a same-sex
couple to inherit from his or her parents, it may be concluded that a Canadian court may
recognize an adoption order from a foreign court.225 In other words, Canadian courts will
give effect to an adoption order and the effect that flows from it if it complies with the
laws of the place where it was ordered.226 However, the position may be different in
jurisdictions that do not recognize domestic partnerships or same-sex marriages.
Whatever the case, to withhold this benefit and protection from these children would
leave them in a vulnerable and unjust position. More so when the child, at the time of the
adoption, had no control over who his or her parents were.227
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In sum, the right of an adopted child to inherit from his or her adoptive parents is
inherent to the adoption, irrespective of the place of adoption or the status of the adoptive
parents. The fact that a state does not recognize the legal relationship between the
adoptive parents is not enough grounds to disinherit the child from succeeding to his/her
adoptive parents’ properties.

5. Recognition of Same-sex Marriage in the United Kingdom
The United Kingdom is among the few countries which recognize same-sex
marriage under its Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act. Before the enactment of this
statute, the UK had in place a civil partnership regime that allowed same-sex couples to
enter into domestic partnerships recognized under UK law. The enactment of the
Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act now enables individuals who are domiciled in the UK
to enter into same-sex marriages in the UK with all the benefits associated with marriage.
The domestic recognition of same-sex marriage presents a conflict of laws issue as to
how the UK courts will treat a same-sex marriage entered into by parties domiciled
outside the UK.
This section provides a brief overview of the domestic regulations of same-sex
marriage in the UK. It looks at the conflict of laws issues that are generated from this
recognition and how they are resolved

5.1 Domestic recognition of same-sex marriage in the United Kingdom
Before the enactment of the Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act, same-sex
marriage in the UK was regulated under the Civil Partnership Act. However, the Civil
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Partnership Act only enabled same-sex couples to enter into civil partnership, though it
provided exactly the same benefits as offered to a heterosexual marriage.228Same-sex
couples were openly able to enjoy rights, greater equality, acceptance and the social
recognition given to heterosexual couples, but the status of marriage was not available to
homosexual individuals. Same-sex couples were not entitled to call each other “husband”
or “wife” for legal purposes. The Civil Partnership Act created what is termed “a separate
but equal regime for same-sex couples”. This was in line with the Matrimonial Causes
Act, 1973, which provided that a marriage is void if the parties are not respectively male
and female.229 These provisions reflected the heterosexual nature of marriage in UK at
the time.
Same-sex marriage is presently regulated under the Marriage (Same-sex Couples)
Act. The Act provides for the legal recognition of same-sex couples. In essence, marriage
has the same effect in relation to same-sex couples as it has in relation to heterosexual
couples.230
Like the Canadian Civil Marriage Act, there is no compulsion to solemnize a
same-sex marriage. Essentially, a person does not contravene a provision of the Act if
they do not consent to a marriage being conducted solely for it being a marriage of a
same-sex couple. These provisions are meant to protect religious leaders who may refuse
to solemnize a same-sex marriage on grounds of religious belief.231
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The Act enables civil partners to convert their civil partnership into marriage.232
But this does not change the nature of civil partnership; it still remains open to same-sex
couples. This means that same-sex couples in the UK have the choice to marry under the
Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act or register as civil partnerships.
There are also provisions for overseas marriage which enables United Kingdom
nationals to marry in prescribed countries or territories outside the United Kingdom.
In summary, The Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act grants same-sex couples the
status of marriage in the UK. Individuals domiciled in the UK have the legal capacity to
enter into same-sex marriages and such unions will be recognized in the UK. A state that
recognizes same-sex marriage will typically recognize a foreign same-sex marriage. The
next section looks at the private international law aspects of same-sex marriage in the
UK.

5.2 Private International Law Aspects of Same-sex Marriage in the UK
Before the enactment of the Marriage (Same-sex Couples) Act, the UK had in
place legislative provisions that regulated the private international law aspects of a samesex marriage. Although the UK did not domestically recognize same-sex marriages,
legislative provisions were put in place for the recognition of foreign same-sex marriages.
In the context of conflict of laws, the Civil Partnership Act provided a regime where
same-sex couples married in a foreign country will be recognized under the Civil
Partnership Act. The recognition of a foreign marriage was regulated under the Civil
Partnership (Treatment of Overseas Relationships)Order 2005 (SI 2005/3042). The
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Order created a regime where foreign same-sex marriage would be recognized in the UK,
although there was no domestic recognition of same-sex marriage in the UK. This made
it possible for same-sex couples to have their foreign marriages registered without the
need to re-register under the Civil Partnership Act. In essence, the order provided relief
for foreign same-sex couples. Although the legal status of marriage was not available to
same-sex couples, the relief under the Civil Partnership Act was essentially the same as
that accorded to heterosexual couples. The rule was that if same-sex marriage was
recognized at the place of celebration and the respective domicile of the parties, then it
would be recognized as a civil partnership for the purpose of UK law. This was because
the UK characterized the foreign same-sex marriage as a civil partnership under the Civil
Partnership Act.
Wilkinson v Kitzinger233 illustrates the treatment of foreign same-sex marriage, in
the UK under the Civil Partnership Act. Wilkinson involved a claim by the petitioners
that their same-sex marriage celebrated in Canada should be recognized as such in
England. The parties, both domiciled in the UK, were married in a civil marriage
ceremony at the Office of the Marriage Commissioner in Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada in 2003. The parties subsequently moved to the UK and sought a declaration that
the marriage was a recognized marriage pursuant to s.55 of the Family Law Act 1996.
Under the UK Civil Partnership Act, a foreign/overseas same-sex marriage will
automatically be recognized as a civil partnership without the parties having to register it
again. Thus, the law only recognizes a civil partnership where a civil marriage has been
validly contracted abroad. The Petitioner argued that, in denying her and the first
Respondent the name and formal status of marriage and "downgrading" her Canadian
233
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marriage to the status of a civil partnership, the impact of the measure upon her is hurt,
humiliation, frustration and outrage. However, the court relied on its private international
law rules and emphasized that legal capacity to marry is judged according to the laws of
the parties' domicile. Since under the English law same-sex marriage was not recognized,
the parties, being English domiciliaries did not have the legal capacity to enter into the
same-sex marriage in Canada. In conclusion, the court relied on section 11 of the
Matrimonial Causes Act which provided that "A marriage celebrated after 30 July 1971
shall be void on the following grounds,
(c) That the parties are not respectively male and female"234
In essence, English law recognized only marriages celebrated between the
opposite sexes. The court cited with approval the decision of the House of Lords in Mette
v Mette235 and Brooks v Brooks,236 that where a person of English domicile purports to
marry in another jurisdiction, but the parties lack capacity to marry in English law, the
marriage is not recognized in England.
Although Wilkinson may have created “hurt, humiliation, frustration and outrage”,
as the petitioners argued, the decision reached by the court was accurate from a conflict
of laws perspective. For the marriage to be valid, it must be both formally and essentially
valid. However, the parties were not without a remedy. As already said, the Civil
Partnership Act created a regime analogous to a marriage with benefits similar to a legal
marriage. Thus, although in a legal sense the parties’ foreign marriage was not
recognized as “marriage” in the legal sense, they were entitled to all the reliefs provided
to civil partners under the Civil Partnership Act.
234
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At present, a marriage under the law of any country or territory outside the United
Kingdom is no longer denied recognition under the law of England only because it is the
marriage of a same-sex couple. In essence, the rules applicable to the recognition of
heterosexual marriages are equally applied to the recognition of foreign same-sex
marriages.
The domestic recognition of same-sex marriage in the UK will typically lead to
recognizing a foreign same-sex marriage. As Symeonides rightly stated, “a state that
allows same-sex marriages within its territory has no legitimate public policy reason to
deny recognition to similar marriages or unions from other states or countries”.237
However, the conflict of laws rule applied in Wilkinson may still apply to determine
whether the parties to a same-sex marriage had the capacity to enter into the marriage. In
addition, other incidents of a foreign same-sex marriage will be equally recognized in the
UK.

6. Conclusion
It is apparent that the public policy exception has not always led to the nonrecognition of certain foreign unions that are considered to violate the laws of the UK and
Canada. This is a sharp departure from the former position in the two countries where an
English court or a Canadian court would refuse to recognize a foreign marriage which is
deemed to be repugnant to the laws and public policy of the two countries, even when the
formal and essential validity of the marriage is beyond question. However, at present,
marriages dissimilar to that practiced in the UK and Canada, such as polygamy and
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incestuous unions which are apparently considered repugnant and odious in the two
countries are given recognition in both, although citizens and individuals domiciled in the
two countries are not allowed to enter into such unions. The approach has been to
distinguish cases that establish the validity of the union and appear to establish
acceptance of the marriage, from incidental issues between the parties. This approach is
also evident in Africa in the area of putative marriage and children born of unions which
are void. In all these cases, there is a recognition that there are many incidents of
marriage beyond the lawfulness or otherwise of the marriage. Thus, the courts are ready
to recognize a foreign union which is not domestically recognized in the country so long
as the recognition is not to eulogize or legitimize the marriage.
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONFLICT OF LAWS ASPECTS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE IN
THE AFRICAN MARRIAGE SYSTEM
1. Introduction
In most African countries, same-sex relationships are seen as un-African or are
simply unaccepted. The family structures in Africa support heterosexual marriage, as
African culture places a high level of importance on marriage and child bearing. 238 It is
debatable whether this same value can be placed on a marriage between people of the
same-sex because “they cannot procreate”. Even so, same-sex relationships continue to
exist in Africa. Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa are some of the countries which accept
certain same-sex marriages under custom.239 Among the Kukatus ethnic group in Kenya,
for instance, woman-to-woman marriages are common.
Notwithstanding the glimpses of evidence, the trend of anti-same-sex legislation
in some African countries depicts a blanket non-recognition of same-sex unions. An
important but often ignored aspect of the debate of same-sex marriage is how such
relationships should be handled by the conflict of laws regimes in African countries.
Indeed, the nature of conflict of laws is such that even countries which do not formally
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allow the institutionalization of same-sex relationships may have to deal with it in a
conflict of laws sense.
This chapter focuses on English-speaking African countries which have little to
no experience with same-sex marriage. In some African countries there is no current
legislation on the subject (e.g. Ghana), others have enacted legislation on the subject (e.g.
Nigeria, Zambia) and some countries are contemplating legislation on the subject. From
the backdrop of chapters three and four, this chapter explores how these countries may
approach the various private international law issues which may arise before their courts
in respect to same-sex unions, whether there is legislation on the subject or not. The
chapter uses hypothetical case scenarios, proffers solutions to those scenarios and
assesses the merits of those solutions.

2. Same-sex Relationships in the African Context
The acceptance/recognition of gay and lesbian rights has recently received a
considerable amount of attention in many African countries. Opposition to same-sex
relationships in Africa is founded on many complex grounds, including a mixture of
religious, cultural, political and anti-colonial sentiments.240 However, while some view
same-sex relationships as un-African, there are others who believe they existed among
some indigenous African tribes. Indeed, it has been argued that same-sex relationships, in
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one form or another, have always existed in Africa. Murray and Roscoe have mentioned
that in their opinion, “homosexuality being absent or incidental to Africa is just a myth
created about Africa by Europeans”.241 In their book, Boy-Wives and Female Husbands:
Studies of African Homosexuality, they present anthropological evidence showing
instances of homosexuality in many parts of Africa. Davidson, for example, gives an
account of a 1958 visit to a Dakar boy brothel. He asserted that Dakar was the “gay” city
of West Africa. Gaudio emphasized the presence of male lesbians and other queer
notions in some Hausa communities in Nigeria. One thing that these authors have
overlooked are the issues of regulation regarding such relationships at the time. The
pertinent question is whether such relationships were sanctioned by law. Was the practice
overtly carried out so that people comfortably identified themselves as being in such
relationships? These questions are germane to understanding the attitude of Africans
towards homosexuals.
Indeed, notwithstanding these historical examples, it can be asserted that the
normative social imperative to marrying and procreation is considered fundamental in
many African communities.242 Most African countries spend a great deal of time painting
marriage as an institution built around procreation. In some jurisdictions, barrenness and
sterility are a ground for divorce.243 The issue of procreation thus seems to override any
affinities of “would-be homosexuals” in Africa. This is supported by the many
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polygamous systems among most African countries. In most African cultures, inheritance
is based on blood relations and an adopted child cannot become a chief. Africans are
conservative and the socialization process reinforces the perception that persons in samesex relationships are deviants. Even where same-sex relationships have been alleged to
have existed, people engaging in the act could not be open about it.244 In some cases,
native custom dictated punishment for attempted sodomy.245 In addition, the overtly
homophobic attitudes and policies of many African states cast doubt on the acceptance of
homosexuality in Africa. The current trend of legislation and public abhorrence of
homosexual activity does not portray the acceptance of homosexuality in most African
countries.

3. Same-sex regulation in Africa
The recognition of same-sex marriage in Africa has been fueled, particularly, by
the many anti-same-sex legislations enacted by some African countries. While some
states explicitly prohibit homosexuality and other forms of same-sex unions, others lack
any express prohibition on homosexual activity but have statutes that establish de facto
criminalization/prohibition of gay and lesbian activities.246 The legislative attitudes of
most African countries portray gay and lesbian rights as domestically unrecognized.
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From a conflict of laws perspective, this also raises the issue whether any recognition will
be given to rights and obligations conferred on same-sex couples by foreign laws.
Domestically, the recognition of homosexual rights has received an unwelcome
attitude from most African countries. It is known that homosexuality is illegal in thirtyfive African countries, and six additional countries have banned male homosexual
activity.247 There are only fifteen African countries that have not explicitly barred
homosexuality by law. These are Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, GuineaBissau, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Madagascar, the Central African Republic, Chad,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic of the Congo,
Mozambique.248 In Nigeria, Zambia, Gambia and Uganda, same-sex marriage/union is
explicitly prohibited.249 Essentially, South Africa is the only African country which
currently allows same-sex marriage under its Civil Union Act, 2006.
Going through the length and breadth of the various anti-homosexual statutes in
Africa, it is not difficult to see public hostility towards homosexuality. The law on the
matter reflects the revulsion felt by the majority of people in Africa. This revulsion and
disdain for homosexual activity is reflected in a number of statutes. In 2009, Uganda
proposed to increase criminal penalties not just for those who engage in homosexual acts,
but also to criminalize activities in civil society that “aid and abet” homosexuality.250
This proposal had significant social and political consequences both inside and outside of
Uganda. The World Bank, for instance, postponed a $90 million loan to Uganda’s health
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system.251 Although the bill was initially suspended, the government passed into law the
Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act in 2014.252 Under the Act, a person was deemed to have
committed an offence if:
(a) he penetrates the anus or mouth of another person of the same-sex
with his penis or any other sexual contraption;
(b) he or she uses any object or sexual contraption to penetrate or
stimulate the sexual organ of a person of the same-sex;
(c) he or she touches another person with the intention of committing
the act of homosexuality.253
The definition of homosexuality thus covered physical sexual activity that did not
just necessarily culminate in intercourse, but encompassed anything which may include
the touching of another’s penis or anus.254 The Act also made room for the persecution of
anyone who was deemed to have sexual affection or expresses interest in a person of the
same-sex.255 It included the prohibition of same-sex marriage.256 The Act allowed those
convicted of homosexuality to be imprisoned for life.257 Although the Ugandan
Constitutional Court has declared the Act unconstitutional,258 the public support that
welcomed the Act reflects the attitude of most Ugandans, and Africans as a whole,
towards homosexuality.
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Nigeria recently enacted the Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, 2013. The Act
prohibits a marriage contract or civil union entered into between persons of the same-sex,
solemnization of same, and for related matters. It is expressly stated that only a marriage
contracted between a man and a woman shall be recognized as valid in Nigeria.259 The
Act not only prohibits same-sex marriage, it also makes it an offence for the registration
of gay clubs, societies and organizations, their sustenance, processions and meetings.260
The position in Nigeria and Uganda reflects the legislative sentiment towards gay and
lesbian rights in Africa. In addition to these two countries, Tanzania also allows for life
imprisonment of an individual who is convicted of same-sex activity.261 In Zambia, a
marriage between persons of the same-sex is void. Under section 27(1)(c) of the
Matrimonial Causes Act, 2007, a marriage shall be void if the parties to the marriage are
of the same-sex.262
In addition to these explicit prohibitions, some states have put legislation in place
which could be interpreted to constitute de facto prohibition against recognition of gay
and lesbian rights. In Ghana, for example, unnatural carnal knowledge is a criminal
offence; even if the act is between consenting adults.263 While the country’s Criminal Act
does not explicitly say that homosexuality is illegal, it seems the section can be
interpreted to include homosexuality.
As well, Kenya’s Penal Code criminalizes sodomy. Under this Code, a “person
who … has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature … or permits a
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male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against the order of nature” commits
a felony, punishable on conviction by a fourteen year prison term. 264 The phrase “against
the order of nature” has been defined as “sexual intercourse or copulation between man
or woman of the same-sex, or either of them with a beast”.265

It is also termed

“buggery”, a crime against nature, an abominable and detestable crime against nature, an
unspeakable crime.266 Although there is no express mention of homosexuality in the Act,
the courts have interpreted the phrase “against the order of nature” to imply the
prohibition of homosexual activities.267
Alongside the criminalization of homosexual activities are statutes which
expressly define marriage as a union between a man and a woman- which then implicitly
excludes same-sex unions. In Kenya, marriage is the voluntary union of a man and a
woman whether in a monogamous or polygamous union.268 The language of the Kenyan
Marriage Act almost exactly mirrors the anti-same-sex laws enacted in Nigeria.269
It is important to mention that while attempts are being made to criminalize samesex relationships, there have been some movement towards positively receiving them.
For example, in May 2012, Malawi’s new President, Joyce Banda, expressed her
intention to scrap the laws criminalizing homosexuality.270 Also, some states legalize
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same-sex sexual activity between two women.271 In South Africa, civil unions in the form
of marriage or civil partnerships are permitted by law. The co-existence of these different
regimes creates a complex web of legal issues from a conflict of laws perspective. It is
debatable whether the current laws in some African states seek to invalidate even the
rights and obligations that are recognized by other countries. Nigeria explicitly prohibits
recognition of foreign same-sex marriage even if the marriage has been validly contracted
under a foreign law.272 However, other African countries have statutes that are purely
domestic and do not address international same-sex relationship cases. It can, however,
be argued that the domestic law reflects domestic public policy which may become
relevant in international cases.

4. Conflict of Laws Aspects of same-sex marriage in Africa
The debate for the recognition of same-sex marriage in Africa has mainly focused
on whether particular states should or should not recognize such relationships. One of the
major issues which have been ignored is the conflict of laws which arise from the
recognition/non-recognition of such unions. That is, how should such relationships be
handled in cross-border situations? For example, will a same-sex marriage that had been
celebrated in Canada be recognized in Ghana? Will the adopted child of a Nigerian samesex couple who resides in the UK be allowed to inherit their parent’s estate in Nigeria?
Can an American same-sex couple adopt from Malawi?
In Nigeria, a marriage contract or civil union entered into between persons of
thesame-sex by virtue of a certificate issued by a foreign country is void, and “any benefit
271
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accruing there-from by virtue of the certificate shall not be enforced by any court of
law”.273 Nigeria seems to be the first country on the African continent to enact anti-samesex legislation having extra-territorial effects. Given the prevalence of anti-same-sex
statutes in Africa, the question is whether these provisions create a blanket nonrecognition of gay and lesbian rights. Indeed, the nature of conflict of laws is such that
even countries that do not formally allow institutionalization of same-sex relationships
may be confronted with the challenge of dealing with it in a conflict of laws scenarios.
The next subsections look at various conflict of laws issues which may arise from
the recognition/non-recognition of same-sex marriage in Africa and how these countries
may approach the various private international law issues that may arise before their
courts in respect to same-sex unions, irrespective of whether there is legislation on the
subject. In trying to proffer solutions to the problems identified, the section will draw on
comparative legislation and jurisprudence from the UK, South Africa and Canada – three
countries that have addressed some of the issues and which were examined in Chapters
Three and Four.

4.1 Succession/Inheritance
Let us consider the following scenario: a Ugandan national A domiciled in
Canada, enters into a civil same-sex marriage in Canada with B, a Ghanaian resident in
Canada. Upon the intestacy of A, how will the Ugandan court devolve the properties of A
situated in Uganda?
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In the case above, the kind of blanket rule of non-recognition, analogous to that
proposed under section 1(2) of Nigeria Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, is illogical
and may create unfair results. In Uganda, the choice of law rule in cases involving
succession is that immovable properties are governed by the law of the place where the
properties are situated, and the laws of place of domicile of the deceased governs the
movables.274 Thus, succession to the immovable property in Uganda of a person deceased
is regulated by the law of Uganda, wherever that person may have had his or her domicile
at the time of his or her death.275

In Nigeria, it has been stated that the lex situs i.e. law of Nigeria, including its
conflict of laws rules governs succession to immovables.276 In the Ghana case of
Youhana v. Abboud277 where two Lebanese, domiciled in Lebanon, died intestate leaving
immovable properties in Ghana, the court held that the devolution of the properties
should be governed by the lex situs. In the scenario given, B must not only prove the
existence of a valid marriage between him and A, but must also prove that he qualified as
a spouse under the applicable law. Under the intestate succession law of Uganda, a
“husband” means a person who at the time of the intestate’s death was (i) validly married
to the deceased according to the laws of Uganda; or (ii) married to the deceased in
another country by a marriage recognized as valid by any foreign law under which the
marriage was celebrated.278 Thus, the burden on B is to prove that the marriage to A was
valid under the laws of Canada. Given that B’s relationship with A is recognized under
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Canadian law as valid, the question arises whether the court will recognize the
relationship of A and B, not-withstanding that Uganda prohibits same-sex marriage.

A strict interpretation of Uganda’s Succession Act will thus entitle B to inherit
A’s properties since the Canadian marriage is “a marriage recognized as valid by the
foreign law under which the marriage was celebrated”. Any other interpretation will
make the current provision under the Succession Act inconsistent with the AntiHomosexuality Act, 2014. Until the legislature clarifies what constitutes “foreign
marriage” under the Succession Act, arguments can be made that the courts may
recognize foreign same-sex marriages for the purposes of succession where any such
marriage has been validly celebrated under the foreign law. Any other interpretation of
the section to deny recognition of a foreign same-sex marriage will not only create
absurdity, but will also lead to injustice in light of the couple having acquired property
together.279

Such absurdity and injustice was evident during the era of blanket nonrecognition of certain domestic unions by the common law courts. As has already been
mentioned, under common law, a marriage that is void ab initio produces none of the
legal incidents of marriage and the parties do not succeed to each other ab intestato.280
Essentially, a void marriage has no legal effect on the parties and can be treated as never
having existed. However, issues relating to the recognition of “invalid” marriages for the

279

Under section 32 if there is no person existing or reasonably ascertainable entitled to take any part of the
property of an intestate, that part or the whole, as the case may be, shall belong to the State.
280
Hahlo, supra note 178 at 487.

91

purposes of an incidental remedy have been addressed in jurisdictions like the UK and
Canada, and also under different concepts such as that of the putative marriage.

In regard to same-sex marriage, Hammerle has emphasized thatthe reasoning
used by courts to recognize "invalid" marriages can be extended by analogy to include
same-sex marriages or civil unions for purposes of intestacy.281 This has been the solution
proffered in Canada and the UK to recognize unions that would be invalid if celebrated in
the two jurisdictions. In Cheni v. Cheni and Haussain v Haussain the English courts
respectively assumed jurisdiction in a union falling under the prohibited degree of
consanguinity and a polygamous marriage. In addition, the Matrimonial Proceedings
(Polygamous Marriages) Act, 1972, represents a benevolent approach towards the
recognition of polygamous marriages celebrated by foreign individuals but such unions
are considered to be domestically invalid in the UK. This is to provide remedy in cases
where the blanket non-recognition of such unions will lead to unjust results. In Haussain,
for example, the court did not allow the husband to rely on the polygamous nature of his
marriage to defeat the claim for a decree of judicial separation. In the Canadian case of
Azam v Jan,282 the court took jurisdiction over a foreign polygamous marriage on public
policy grounds.283 It acknowledged the marriage for the limited purpose of providing an
adequate remedy although the court was satisfied that whatever its foreign legality, it is
invalid in Canada.
281
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The issue of succession has been one of the many areas a Canadian or UK court
may recognize as valid, a union which cannot be entered into in the two countries. In Yew
v. Attorney-General of British Columbia,284 the court recognized both wives of a
polygamous marriage and held that they are entitled to the benefits extended to wives
under the Succession Duty Act.285 The non-recognition of the marriage would have meant
that the testator's two wives, admittedly lawfully married in China to the testator and
throughout his life, would have been without a remedy.286 As McPhillips J.A. rightly
noted, this would be contrary to natural justice.287

In addition to judicial intervention to remedy the injustice that result from blanket
non-recognition, provincial legislation has also provided remedy to cure such results that
may flow from situations like in the scenario above.288 For example, the Ontario Family
Law Act289 has been interpreted to include parties who have undergone a marriage
ceremony or event in good faith but did not have the capacity to enter into the marriage
(e.g. by reason of prohibited degrees of consanguinity) and, parties to a voidable
marriage, as well as spouses to a polygamous marriage.290 In the context of same-sex
marriage and from an African perspective, this will include the extension of family law
benefits to same-sex couples as pertained to heterosexual couples. In South Africa it has
284
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been held that the word “marriage” in s 3 of the Divorce Act must be read to include
registered foreign same-sex marriages or civil unions/partnerships which are lawful in the
country in which they are concluded.291 In essence, any ancillary or pendente lite relief
contemplated under the Divorce Act is available to same-sex partners.292It must, however,
be mentioned that the extension of such benefits to couples involved in an invalid
marriage does not confer on individuals domiciled in the country the right to enter into
such unions. The recognition is for the limited purpose under the Act.

Ideally, universal recognition of same-sex marriage will avoid the conflict of laws
aspect of succession as it relates to such marriages. However, the public policy of
countries differ significantly. Short of recognition, English-speaking African countries
can recognize such relationships when the question has to do with inheritance. In this
case, the court is not being called upon to recognize or sanction the relationship during
the lives of the parties.293 The recognition is for the limited purpose of inheritance.

4.2 Adoption
In a different scenario, A, a Ghanaian national domiciled in Canada, enters into a
civil union in South Africa with B, a Nigerian resident of Canada. The couple adopts C as
their son underSouth Africa’s adoption laws. Upon the death intestate of A and B, how
291
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will the courts in Nigeria treat C for the purposes of the devolution of A’s properties in
Nigeria?
This scenario illustrates the cross-border issues which may arise from
international adoption. In jurisdictions like Nigeria where same-sex marriage is expressly
prohibited and gay and lesbians rights curtailed, it can be argued that gays and lesbians
do not have the right to adopt a child by reason of their sexual orientation.294 Other
jurisdictions provide equal adoption regimes for both same-sex couples and heterosexual
couples. The South African Children’s Act provides for adoption of a child by partners in
a permanent domestic life partnership or whose permanent domestic life-partner is the
parent of the child.295 In general, an adoption order confers full parental responsibilities
and rights in respect to the adopted child onto the adoptive parent. Under the Children’s
Act of South Africa, the adopted child, for all purposes, is regarded as the child of the
adoptive parent, and an adoptive parent is, for all purposes, regarded as the parent of the
adopted child.296
Thus, in the case above, C is treated, for all purposes, as the child of A and B in
South Africa.297 In Kenya, an adoption order made by any court of competent jurisdiction
shall be recognized by its courts.298 Given that Kenya is also party to the Hague
Convention on the Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Inter-Country
Adoption, 1993, it is debatable whether Kenya can use the non-recognition of same-sex
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unions to refuse the incident of adoption that may flow from such a union. Although it is
not explicitly stated in the adoption laws of Nigeria that same-sex persons may not adopt,
the many laws in Nigeria that criminalize same-sex activities may support the assertion
that the country does not recognize the rights of homosexuals to adopt, and by extension
same-sex couples.299 The question arises whether the courts will recognize C as the
legitimate child of A and B for the purposes of succession.
Nigerian adoption laws vary from state to state. In general, there is a combination
of residency and age requirements, as well as the requirement of married couples to adopt
jointly. Most of the legislation in the various states deals with domestic adoption. At
present, no Nigerian legislation deals with the private international law issues which
could potentially arise in adoption proceedings.300 As Oppong rightly noted, this is
remarkable, since there are a number of issues that may arise where it may be necessary
for a court to decide whether or not to recognize a foreign adoption order. 301 The
determination of the rights of an adopted child to inherit from his adoptive parents
squarely falls into one of these issues. In the absence of a statutory regime for recognising
foreign adoption orders, it is doubtful whether Nigeria will apply the English common
law rule on the recognition of foreign adoption in the context of same-sex couples.302
Essentially, this will give C the status of a child and the right to inherit to the properties
of A and B. The blanket rule of non-recognition, analogous to that proposed under section
299
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1(2) of the Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act, 2013, will be irrational and may create
unjust results. These are practical issues which should be of concern to African nations
contemplating the recognition/non-recognition of same-sex marriage. In the absence of
any legislation, Oppong has recommended that, generally, an adoption order made in a
jurisdiction where the child was resident, a national or domiciled should be recognized.303
Though this seems to cover every situation, it appears Oppong did not consider the issues
which could potentially arise from cross-border adoption relating to homosexuality and
the new trend of legislation recommending blanket non-recognition of homosexual rights
in Africa. This notwithstanding, the position recommended by Oppong could be
generally applied to adoption involving both opposite sex and same-sex couples.304 The
best interest of the child should be paramount in all adoption-related decisions and the
fact that the child “did not have the will to choose his/her own parents” should not be
ignored.305 In Canada, it has been said that the courts will give effect to an adoption
order and the effect that flows from it if it complies with the laws of the place in which it
was ordered.306This will ensure that the adoption orders which are considered valid in the
originating state (the state where the order was made) are recognized in all countries.
Related to the issue of adoption is the legitimacy of the children of same-sex
marriages, especially lesbians. What is the legal status of children raised by same-sex
couples? Are these children legitimate or illegitimate? Which law determines the
legitimacy of such children?
303
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The legitimacy of the children that may come out of a same-sex marriage has not
received much attention in most English-speaking African countries. In Nigeria the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child is determined by the laws of the country in which its
parents are domiciled at the time of the child’s birth.307 This also seems to be the position
in Ghana, Kenya and South Africa, where the courts of domicile of the child or the
domicile of the applicant have jurisdiction to declare whether a child is legitimate.308 It is
debatable whether the use of the word “parents” covers same-sex couples. The fact that
some of these children may not be biologically related to their parents raises the question
whether such children are legitimate to inherit from the “other parent”? In a case where A
is the life partner of B and C is the biological child of only B, and not A, the question is
whether C can inherit from A on the death intestate of A. In this case, unless there is a
formal adoption, A is a legal stranger to C and C has no right to inherit from the nonbiological parent, A.309 Going by the conflict of laws rules which have been used to
determine the issue of legitimacy of children as applied in Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya,C
would be considered an illegitimate child if the parents are domiciled in any of above
countries. This is more so given the blanket non-recognition of same-sex relationships as
proposed in these countries. The non-recognition of this relationship will mean that C
would be denied the right to inherit from A irrespective of the fact that A would probably
have expected C to recover from her estate. However, as Trast rightly said “children born
to same-sex parents should not suffer legal disadvantages simply because society may not
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approve of their parents' way of life. To withhold this benefit and protection from these
children leaves them in a vulnerable and unjust position”.310

4.3 Re-marriage
Another area where the strict application of blanket non-recognition of same-sex
marriage may lead to absurdity and unjust results is of re-marriage.311A, a Ghanaian
domiciled in Ghana enters into a same-sex marriage in Canada with B, a Canadian
domiciled. A subsequently visits Ghana and purports to enter into a civil marriage with C.
Can B(or anyone) enter a caveat to stop the marriage on the basis that he is already
married to A under the Civil Marriage Act of Canada? If the marriage is entered into, can
A be charged with the offence of bigamy?
In Ghana a marriage is invalid when either of the parties, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, is married under an applicable law to a person other than the
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person with whom the marriage is celebrated.312 This also seems to be the position in
Kenya where a union is not a marriage if at the time of the making of the union either
party is incompetent to marry by reason of a subsisting marriage. 313 Essentially, under
most marriage laws in Africa, a marriage is not valid when either of the parties thereto at
the time of the celebration of such marriage is “married” to another person.314Thus, the
subsistence of a valid marriage constitutes a valid impediment against any of the parties’
to contract another marriage.
In re Clara Sackitey,315 the Ghanaian court found that the applicant and the
respondent were validly married under customary law. Under the circumstances, the
court held that until the first marriage is dissolved, the respondent cannot validly marry
any other woman under the provisions of the Marriage Ordinance except the applicant.
The position is also supported by the Ghana Court of Appeal case of Ruth Arthur v John
Hector Ansah & Naomi Owusu,316 where it was held that the Ordinance Marriage
celebrated between the first and second defendants was unlawful and of no effect in the
light of the existing customary marriage subsisting between the plaintiff and first
defendant which has not been dissolved. It can be inferred from the cases that the
invalidity of the second marriage arose from the subsistence of the previous marriage and
hence the validity of the previous marriage. In re Clara Sackitey, the court allowed the
applicant to caveat against the celebration of the ordinance marriage because of the
existence of a valid customary marriage between the applicant and the respondent.
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However, where the purported first marriage was void, the validity of the subsequent
marriage cannot be questioned on the basis of the void marriage. In the Kenyan case of H
N N v M N & Another,317the appellant averred that her marriage with the first respondent
was valid and still subsisted, and that the first respondent could not lawfully undergo a
church wedding with the second respondent whilst the first marriage still subsisted. The
court, however, found on evidence that there was no valid marriage between the appellant
and the first respondent to constitute a bar to the respondent entering into another
marriage.318 Accordingly, the first respondent had the capacity to perform the marriage
ceremony with the second respondent.
In Ghana, a person who, knowing that a marriage subsists between him/her and
any person, goes through the ceremony of marriage, whether in Ghana or elsewhere, with
some other person commits the offence of bigamy.319This provision suggests that the
previous marriage must be valid in order for the offence of bigamy to be committed.320 In
Nigeria, it is an offence punishable by five years’ imprisonment for a person to go
through a ceremony of marriage with a person whom he or she knows to be married to
another person.321 The offence of bigamy is thus founded on the issue whether there was
a prior subsisting marriage between one of the parties and a third person.
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From the scenario above, B must prove that there was a valid marriage between
him and A, and that the said marriage still subsists. In the context of Nigeria, B’s
marriage to A under the Civil Marriage Act is invalid. The Same-sex Marriage
(Prohibition) Act, does not recognize the said marriage for any purpose. A strict
application of the Act will mean that B has no capacity to file a caveat against the
proposed marriage between A and C, since in the eyes of the law, A has not entered into
any marriage.322 That is, in this particular case, there is a prior subsisting marriage
according to Canadian law, but according to the conflict of laws and domestic laws of
Nigeria, there is no such prior marriage. A fortiori, A cannot be charged with the offence
of bigamy since the previous marriage for which the offence is determined is held to be
invalid.
Similarly, in a country like Kenya where marriage is defined as a union between a
man and a woman, it seems the capacity of A to enter into a subsequent marriage cannot
be questioned on the basis of the Canadian marriage. In this case A, can argue that the
same-sex marriage was not regarded as marriage in Kenya, and that he was, therefore,
legally, a single person. The effect of the blanket non-recognition of A’s marriage to B is
that the civil marriage will still subsist under Canadian conflict of laws and the second
marriage between A and C will be void. The converse will be the position in Nigeria the
second marriage between A and C will be valid and the civil marriage between A and B
will be void. This is more so since Nigeria will not recognize the Canadian marriage and,
thus, will not grant divorce.323 Thus, from a conflict of laws perspective, A would be

322

In a different but related context see H N N v M N & Another, supra note 318.
It is debatable whether it can be argued that the first marriage is automatically terminated the moment
the second is celebrated. This seems to be the position adopted in South Africa internal conflict of laws in
323

102

validly married under two laws. But while A may be charged with bigamy under the laws
of Canada, he may lawfully contract a valid marriage in Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya. As
Koppelman has rightly noted, the position in Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya will lead to the
situation where
People in same-sex marriages could desert their dependents with
impunity and, by crossing a border, free themselves of all obligations of
marital property. They could even marry other people without telling
those people about their still-existing marriages.324
In contrast to the positions in Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya, in South Africa civil
marriage is recognized. In this case, B can raise an objection to any proposed marriage
between A and any other person on the basis that his marriage with A is valid and still
subsists.325 The Canadian marriage will thus constitute a legal impediment to A’s
subsequent marriage to any other person. This will prevent the situation where A can be
validly married under two separate legal regimes. However, the South African regime
will also provide an avenue for A to divorce B if A intends to marry C. In AS v CS, the
court concluded that a same-sex marriage or same-sex civil union is capable of
dissolution under section 3 of the Divorce Act, 1979.326 As has already been mentioned,
the word “marriage” in section 3 of the Divorce Act has been interpreted to include
registered foreign same-sex marriages or civil unions/partnerships which are lawful in the
country in which they are concluded.327 These provisions provide an avenue for A’s
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marriage under the Civil Marriage Act to be divorced in South Africa under the Divorce
Act, 1979.
These cases illustrate possible conflict of laws issues which may arise from the
recognition/non-recognition of same-sex marriage in the context of re-marriage. The
cases illustrate that a refusal to recognize a same-sex marriage could cause substantial
hardship and injustice to individuals. A rule of blanket non-recognition has the
consequence of leading to multiple marriages, and a situation where a valid same-sex
marriage produces no legal effect when one party crosses to a state that does not
recognize such unions. In countries where a blanket rule of non-recognition of practicing
same-sex persons’ rights exist, this level of injustice may occur unless the courts are
ready to recognize the marriage for limited purposes, while still refusing to recognize the
relationship in other contexts.

4.4 Jurisdiction
One area in which blanket non-recognition of same-sex marriage will lead to an
unjustifiable result is in the exercise of jurisdiction in matrimonial causes. For example,
A, a Ghanaian national domiciled in Nigeria, enters into a civil marriage with B, a
national of South Africa. A later deserts B and settles in his country of domicile, Nigeria.
Can B petition a court in Nigeria or Ghana for divorce? Alternatively, can A institute
matrimonial proceedings in Nigeria or Ghana for a decree of nullity of the marriage?
Whether a court has jurisdiction, or, alternatively, can assume jurisdiction over
matrimonial causes is tied to the legal system of each country. Matrimonial actions may
arise in cases of divorce, nullity of marriage, judicial separation, presumption of death
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and dissolution of marriage. In general, the court exercising jurisdiction must have a
connection to the parties of the action. In most cases, the primary question is whether or
not the parties have connection with the territorial area over which the court has exercised
its jurisdiction. Factors such as domicile, nationality and residency are some of the main
considerations that are involved in determining the issue. In Ghana, the connecting
factors in matrimonial causes are determined under section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes
Act. A court may have jurisdiction when either party to the marriage is a citizen of
Ghana, domiciled in Ghana or has been ordinarily a resident in Ghana for at least three
years immediately preceding the commencement of the proceedings. 328 Essentially, a
party must be able to establish one of these connecting factors for the courts to accept
jurisdiction.
The position in Ghana is similar to the regime in South Africa. In South Africa, a
court can exercise divorce jurisdiction if either of the parties are domiciled in the area of
the court on the date of which the action is instituted, or is ordinarily a resident in the area
of jurisdiction of the court on the said date, or has been ordinarily a resident in South
Africa for a period of not less than one year immediately prior to that date.329
Significantly, the fact that one of the parties is a national of South Africa cannot, on its
own, confer jurisdiction upon the court. This is contrary to the position in Ghana where
nationality is considered to be a factor allowing the court to exercise matrimonial
jurisdiction over the parties. A South African court may exercise matrimonial jurisdiction
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over a foreign national domiciled in the country while refusing jurisdiction over one of its
own nationals on the grounds that the person is not domiciled in or is a resident of the
Republic. This is also the case in Nigeria, where proceedings for a decree of dissolution
of marriage, judicial separation, nullity, restitution of conjugal rights, and jactitation of
marriage may only be instituted by a person domiciled in Nigeria. 330 The issue of
domicile is thus a vital and germane condition allowing for the court to exercise
jurisdiction.331 The fact that one of the parties to the proceedings is a resident of Nigeria,
or a national of the country does not, in and of itself, provide a basis for the courts to
exercise jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings. However, in Kenya, domicile and
residency are the main connecting factors, albeit, jurisdiction is exercised mainly in
accordance with the law applied in matrimonial proceedings in the High Court in
England.332
Indeed, the use of domicile as a factor in matrimonial proceedings is one of the
many influences that the English common law left in English-speaking African
countries.333 Historically, under the common law, domicile was the main factor allowing
a court to exercise jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings.334 However, the common law
position has been that the wife followed the husband’s domicile and in cases of an
application for divorce, the court which has jurisdiction is that of which the husband was
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domiciled at the time the action was instituted.335 The domicile of a married woman was
thus tied to that of his husband.336 One problem with the wife’s domicile of dependency
arose when the husband deserted her after the marriage and resides abroad.337 In this case,
the strict application of the rule meant that the wife is unable to institute divorce
proceedings in another jurisdiction. Instead, she must commence the proceedings in the
jurisdiction in which the husband is domiciled. The effect was that a deserted wife would
have remained bound to a marriage existing only in name. The rule was deemed
discriminatory and combined with the potential injustices and hardships it may create, it
335
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explains the basis for additional grounds of jurisdiction or departure from the common
law rules on the exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction.338
Accordingly, it can be seen that although there are differences in the provisions of
the countries as to which factors may connect a party to one country enabling the court
to exercise jurisdiction, one clear factor, however, is that one of the parties having a
connection to the country may be grounds enough for the court to assume jurisdiction.
Although the issues of domicile and residency are arguably the two most
contentious factors in the determination of jurisdiction in matrimonial causes, an exercise
to analyze the determination of these two factors would be far beyond the scope of this
section.339 Suffice it to say that residency and domicile are two perfectly distinct
components, and long residency per se, although relevant, is rarely a deciding factor in
determining domicile for the purposes of matrimonial proceedings.340 The fact that a
Lebanese national with a Lebanese domicile of origin lived and worked in Ghana for 23
years, had property in Ghana, had applied for Ghanaian citizenship, had applied for
Ghanaian nationality for his son, and it was his intention that his son should take over his
business in Ghana, were still not grounds enough for him to acquire a Ghanaian domicile
of choice.341 A mere statement of intention to live in one country, without any supporting
evidence of an intention to stay permanently, will not justify the acquisition of a new
domicile of choice.342
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As is apparent from the above, the court, in exercising jurisdiction, does not
consider the merits or otherwise of the cases. That is, jurisdiction over the subject matter
is significantly different from whether the court has jurisdiction over the parties. 343 The
issue of matrimonial jurisdiction is basically whether one of the factors has been
established so the parties over whom jurisdiction are exercised is deemed to be connected
to the court which is assuming jurisdiction over them. In each case, the connecting factor
must be established as condition precedent to confer jurisdiction on the court. In Schiratti
v. Schiratti, the High Court in Nairobi refused to hear a petition for divorce filed by an
Italian national who claimed to be domiciled in Kenya. In the considered opinion of the
court, the petitioner failed to establish that he is domiciled in Kenya.344 However,
whether a court may withhold jurisdiction on the basis of the subject matter regardless of
the fact that there is a real and substantial connection to the parties has yet to be
explored.345
In the context of conflict of laws, and from the perspective of same-sex marriage,
the provisions discussed on the exercise of matrimonial jurisdiction are instructive since
they are not framed in terms of gender. In the scenario above, the burden placed upon the
party who seeks to confer jurisdiction on the court is to establish that one of the parties is
connected to the court on grounds of one or more of the connecting factors. In this case,
matrimonial proceedings for nullity or divorce may be commenced in a Nigerian court,
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where A is domiciled, or a Ghanaian court, where A is a national. This position is
supported by section 31 of the Matrimonial Causes Act of Ghana and section 2(2) of the
Matrimonial Causes Act of Nigeria. This should be the position, regardless of whether
the two states either permit or, adversely, do not recognize same-sex marriages. The court
should be able to exercise jurisdiction over the parties to declare the marriage void or a
nullity. This is the case so far as the party is able to establish the prerequisites for the
court to exercise jurisdiction.
In the context of exercising jurisdiction over foreign polygamous marriages,
Bielby J. has observed, obiter, in Azam v Jan, that even if the courts cannot terminate
(i.e. by divorce) such a marriage, it is difficult to understand why a court should not be
able to grant a declaration that an actively polygamous marriage is not recognized under
Canadian law, including a declaration that it is a nullity here (if that were the law).346 In
his opinion, if the courts clearly have jurisdiction to terminate foreign (monogamous)
marriages, why should they not be able to terminate “all valid foreign marriages” if the
parties otherwise meet the Canadian residential and other prerequisites to divorce?347 The
plausible inference from Bielby J’s observation is that the court is clothed with
jurisdiction in matrimonial causes so far as the prerequisites for exercising jurisdiction
are satisfied. Indeed, the fact that the foreign marriage in question is not recognized in
Canada is not grounds for the courts to refuse jurisdiction.348 These observations are very
instructive in matrimonial causes involving same-sex couples who seek relief in a state
which does not recognize same-sex marriages.
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As with the case of matrimonial causes in polygamous marriages, matrimonial
proceedings involving same-sex couples terminate the familial relationship rather than
create one. By petitioning for divorce or nullity of their marriage, the parties are not
seeking recognition as a married couple. In essence, the court is not invited to legalize or
endorse the same-sex marriage, but to discontinue and determine the void marriage. In
Christiansen v. Christiansen,349 the Supreme Court of Wyoming in the United States
considered a divorce petition resulting from a Canadian same-sex marriage. The district
court had earlier ruled that the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the petition because
the Wyoming court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over the case (the State of
Wyoming does not recognize same-sex marriage). Reversing the district court's dismissal
of the divorce petition, and holding that the Wyoming court had jurisdiction over the
case, the Supreme Court reasoned that
recognizing a valid foreign same-sex marriage for the limited purpose
of entertaining a divorce proceeding does not lessen the law or policy
in Wyoming against allowing the creation of same-sex marriages. A
divorce proceeding does not involve recognition of a marriage as an
ongoing relationship. Indeed, accepting that a valid marriage exists
plays no role except as a condition precedent to granting a divorce.
After the condition precedent is met, the laws regarding divorce apply.
Laws regarding marriage play no role.350
The instructive reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s decision was that the law
and policy of the State of Wyoming prohibiting the celebration and recognition of samesex marriage is not undermined or impaired where in a matrimonial proceeding involving
same-sex couples, the parties only seek a dissolution of the marriage rather than
enforcement or acceptance of the union. Christiansen provides insights for courts
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considering whether to exercise jurisdiction in matrimonial proceedings involving samesex marriage where the state prohibits such marriages. A voidable marriage may be
dissolved or declared a nullity without recognizing the marriage as valid, or, the court
may recognize the marriage for the limited purpose of granting the matrimonial relief. 351
Neither approach requires the court to rule, or even opine upon the validity of the
marriage before it.352 Byrn and Holcomb rightly note that in putative spouse cases,
divorce and nullity are the available remedies to parties who have entered their marriage
in good faith even though the marriage is technically void.353 In doing so, the court need
not recognize the marriage as valid. This principle could be equally applied in
matrimonial proceedings where a same-sex couple seeks nullity of his or her foreign
marriage. Without this, the parties will be tied to a marriage which apparently does not
exist.
In sum, it is submitted that parties to a same-sex marriage should be entitled to
commence matrimonial proceedings in any jurisdiction, provided the requirements for the
court to accept jurisdiction are met. There seems to be no reason for refusing this relief in
the case of a valid foreign same-sex marriage where the parties have satisfied the
requirements for the court to exercise jurisdiction over them. The courts should have the
ability to differentiate between cases which seek to establish the validity of the marriage,
and those merely requesting matrimonial relief. Exercising jurisdiction over same-sex
marriages for the purposes of matrimonial relief does not necessarily imply the
legitimization or condonation of the practice of same-sex relationships in those countries.
351
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5. Conclusion
The foregoing discussion shows that same-sex relationships will likely be held
violative of the laws in many English-speaking African countries. In Nigeria, Ghana and
Kenya, the definition of marriage envisages a union between a man and a woman. There
seems to be a great deal of hostility in African countries towards same-sex relationships.
This is evident from the trend in anti-same-sex legislation in the region. The resentment
and hostility is similar to the attitude toward polygamy and incestuous marriages in
Canada and the UK. Indeed, in Canada, polygamy is counted among barbarous acts, and
the country has recently reaffirmed its resentment against polygamous unions by putting
it under the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act.354 Thus, aside the
Criminal Code of Canada making polygamy a crime, the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric
Cultural Practices Act, reinforces the hostility of Canada towards polygamy. However,
Canadian courts have, in conflict of laws situation, always dealt with marriages that are
prohibited in the jurisdiction. The fact that unions, like polygamy, are not domestically
recognized in Canada has not deterred or stopped the Canadian courts from exercising
jurisdiction over such relationships where the parties satisfy the jurisdictional
requirements for matrimonial causes.
With the world gradually but surely moving towards accepting and
institutionalizing same-sex relationships, African countries must be ready to deal with the
conflict of law issues that may potentially arise from the recognition or non-recognition
of these unions. As observed above, countries where same-sex marriages are explicitly
prohibited may still be faced with having to deal with it in a conflict of laws context.
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Matrimonial proceedings and cases relating to the incidents of foreign same-sex
marriages may still have to be litigated in some countries where there is blanket nonrecognition of this marriage. Blanket non-recognition will, in some cases, not only lead
to unfair results, but will be inconsistent with justice and equity. In general, African
courts should be able to use the incidental approach to differentiate between cases which
seek to legitimize the relationship in the country and those that merely seek to ask for
incidental relief. This approach will remedy the harshness and injustice that a blanket
non-recognition of the relationship will have on the parties.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION
1. Overview
This thesis has assessed the cross-border legal questions posed by same-sex
relationships in the context of the relevant regulatory/legislative regimes of Englishspeaking African countries, specifically, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya and South Africa. The
thesis examined how the conflict of laws issues generated by unions which are not
domestically recognized in the host state, and are explicitly prohibited in some
jurisdictions, have been resolved. The discussion established that same-sex relationships
will likely be held to violate the marriage laws of most African countries.355 In most
African countries, there is a great deal of hostility, resentment and prejudice towards
homosexual relationships, and this has resulted in the passing of statutes prohibiting
homosexual acts, and reaffirming the "one man, one woman" marriage statutes.356
Indeed, in countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and Kenya, same-sex relationships are either
explicitly prohibited, or there is legislation which can be interpreted to prohibit such
unions.
Domestic unions like polygamy, marriage between relatives, and Muslim
marriages appear to be treated differently in each jurisdiction, and it is apparent that in
Africa, these relationships would be recognized in another country if the essential and
formal requirements of the marriage are satisfied. Invariably, the most important
consideration is that the union is between opposite sexes. As well, notwithstanding the
differences in each jurisdiction, these unions are common among the countries under
355

One significant aspect in the discussion of same-sex marriage in Africa is the moral disagreement over
same-sex relationships and the question whether homosexuality is (or should be) an accepted practice.
However, the subject is beyond the scope of this thesis and may form the basis of a future study.
356
In Hyde v. Hyde, (1866) LR 1 P&D 130 marriage was considered the voluntary union for life of one
man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.

115

study. But this is not the case in regard to same-sex marriage. Statutes such as the
Nigeria’s Same-sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act explicitly provide that a same-sex
marriage entered into between persons of the same gender in a foreign country shall be
void in Nigeria, and any benefits accruing by virtue of the marriage shall not be enforced
by any court of law in Nigeria.357 This rule of blanket non-recognition of foreign samesex unions means that even the incidents of such relationships would not be given any
legal effect in the host country.
Contrary to the position in most English-speaking African countries, there is
growing inclination towards the recognition of same-sex relationships across the globe
and this is likely to grow in the near future.358 This trend means that African states that do
not domestically recognize same-sex relationships may, nevertheless, be confronted with
them in one way or another in a conflict of laws context. Koppelman argues that if each
state could confine same-sex relationships within its borders, so that, for instance, a
same-sex marriage stays in the country where it was entered into, and other states do not
have anything to do with such relationships, then no conflict of laws issues will arise.359
However, it is virtually impossible for such a state of affairs to exist. The consequence of
cross-border mobility, change of residency after marriage, inter-country adoption, and the
fact that same-sex couples may own property outside the jurisdiction where the marriage
was celebrated, are predominant. The cross-border issues are also exacerbated by the fact
that the personal laws of the proposed same-sex couples, in some countries, are not given
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paramount consideration. Whether the parties can enter into a same-sex marriage under
the applicable choice-of-law rule is seldom raised in the state of celebration of the
marriage.360 In most cases, whether the intended marriage will be recognized outside of
the place of celebration is not questioned before the celebration, and some legal systems
disregard the national law of the spouse or the law of the state of their habitual
residence.361It was noted that in Canada, for example, the fact that the laws of the place
of domicile of an individual prohibit same-sex relationships, or whether a party to the
marriage is a national of a country whose laws prohibit same-sex unions does not
constitute a bar against the individuals seeking to celebrate their same-sex marriage in
Canada. This means that individuals from countries where same-sex marriage is
prohibited would be free to enter into such unions in Canada without recourse to their
personal law. From a conflict of laws perspective, the fact that domicile or nationality is
not an essential requirement to the celebration of a same-sex marriage in some
jurisdictions raises the question whether such a marriage will be recognized outside the
country in which the union was entered into.
The above reinforces the inevitable, that that even countries which do not
domestically recognize same-sex relationships would have to find answers to the conflict
of laws questions that such marriages would bring up for their consideration and
adjudication. The possibility or reality of these cross-border issues means that laws which
preclude giving "any legal effect" to same-sex relationships will, in some cases, lead to
arbitrary and unjustifiable results.
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The injustices which may occur in some situations where the strict nonrecognition is applied were addressed in Chapter Four. It was argued there that, first, in
the case of inheritance, an adopted child may be refused the right to succession to his or
her adopted same-sex parents’ property, notwithstanding that the parents considered
him/her as their child during their lifetimes. Second, a same-sex spouse would not be able
to inherit or succeed to the other spouse’s property in jurisdictions where a blanket rule of
non-recognition exists, should the latter die intestate. In Nigeria, for example, this will be
the position since the law does not recognize the legal effect of the marriage, and
accordingly, the surviving spouse cannot establish his or her status as a spouse to benefit
from the estate of the deceased. Third, a same-sex couple who relocate to a jurisdiction
which applies a blanket rule of non-recognition of same-sex unions, may enter into
another marriage without recourse to the existing same-sex marriage, and the spouse
under the same-sex marriage cannot enforce the existence of the union in the host
country. This is so, since the host state does not recognize a marriage having ever existed
between the putative husband and another person. Finally, same-sex couples seeking
nullity or divorce of their marriage may be refused jurisdiction even where they have
satisfied the requirements for the court to exercise jurisdiction over them. These
situations are all apparent where the courts refuse to give any legal effect to a foreign
same-sex union.
The absurd results and injustice consequent to the application of the rule nonrecognition also existed in jurisdictions like Canada and the UK when their courts refused
to recognize certain domestic unions such as polygamy. The discussion in chapter 3
evidences this. But it also establishes that both Canada and the UK later departed from
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not according any legal effect to domestic unions like polygamy, and began to assume
jurisdiction for purposes of curing the mischief and injustices occasioned by nonrecognition. The UK and Canadian courts chose to distinguish between cases which seek
to legitimize the union, from those which seek incidental relief. This way, they were able
to give effect to the consequences of a marriage that is not otherwise domestically
recognized in the two jurisdictions without legitimizing them. They have reasoned that
exercising jurisdiction over such prohibited unions does not infringe their public policies
which do not recognize the unions. Indeed, the fact that the marriage took place in
another country is part of the reason why public policy does not intervene.362
Koppelmen, says that unions that are not domestically recognized in these states
by reason of their public policies– such as interracial marriage, incest and polygamy –
have, nevertheless, been given limited recognition for the purpose of proceedings to
enforce incidents flowing from them without legitimizing them. He argues that a similar
approach is the best way to find a truce in the war over same-sex marriage.363 Although
Koppelmen deals with the recognition of same-sex marriage in the US, his account of the
situation and the solution he offers fits into the context of Africa.364This approach,
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See Martha Bailey et el, “Expanding Recognition of Foreign Polygamous Marriages: Policy
Implications for Canada” (2008-2009) 25 Nat'l J. Const. L. 83 at 92.
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See in general, Koppelman, supra note 201.
364
It is worth mentioning that Koppelman’s account of same-sex marriage reflects the previous position in
the US where same-sex marriage was illegal and prohibited in certain states. However, it has been reported
that since June 2013, in United States v. Windsor (2013) 133 S.Ct. 2675 when the Supreme Court struck
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Obergefellet al. v. Hodges, Director, Ohio Department of Health, et al(26 June 2015) 14/556 (Supreme
Court of the United States), online: <http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/14pdf/14-556_3204.pdf>.
The decision means that a man or woman can marry same-sex in all state when hitherto happened in just 35
states in the US. From a conflict of laws perspective same-sex couples from jurisdictions where same-sex
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together with aspects of the Canadian and UK regimes which effectively recognise
domestic unions otherwise prohibited in the two jurisdictions, offer some lessons for
English-speaking African countries that may choose to adapt them.
The next section looks at some lessons that English-speaking African countries
may learn from Canada and the UK to deal with the cross-border issues that may arise
from same-sex marriages.

2. Lessons for English-speaking Africa from Canada and the UK
Canada and the UK have been able to effectively resolve the conflict of laws
issues which arise from foreign unions that are domestically prohibited in the two
jurisdictions. In both countries, this has been done through legislation and judicial
intervention. Until recently, most family law legislation in Africa viewed marriage from a
heterosexual perspective, and gave little to no attention to the recognition of same-sex
marriage. Chapter four demonstrated that recent legislation on the subject portrays a
movement towards entirely prohibiting same-sex relationships in most jurisdictions, with
little to no attention to the cross-border issues arising from such unions. At present, it is
not clear how African courts will deal with the cross-border issues that may arise from
the recognition/non-recognition of same-sex marriage. The absence of judicial decisions
in Africa on this makes it a challenge to predict what a court will do when faced with the
conflict of laws aspects of same-sex marriage.
African courts can learn from Canada and the UK. However, specific conditions,
such as theirpolitical, geographical, cultural and social context, require that they
marriage has been celebrated will now have their union recognised when they move from the state where
the marriage was performed to another state.
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contemplate solutions that may not be found in Canada and the UK. From the analysis,
however, it is suggested that the following lessons be adopted by English-speaking
African countries for their private international law approaches to cases involving samesex relationships celebrated abroad.
First, African courts should have the authority to entertain same-sex marriages
where the parties satisfy the requirements for the court to assume jurisdiction. In general,
persons who want to know whether they are married or single should be given broad
access to the courts to get an answer.365As discussed, for instance, under Ontario’s Rules
of Civil Procedure,366 a party seeking a declaration of nullity of his/her marriage need not
show affiliation between the forum and the facts giving rise to the cause of action,
although in practice, one of the parties may be connected to the forum court by reason of
one or more of the grounds required for the court to exercise jurisdiction over the
parties.367 In the context of same-sex marriage, and with specific reference to Englishspeaking African countries, this example means that the fact that the same-sex union was
entered into in another jurisdiction is not enough consideration for the court to refuse
jurisdiction. Essentially, that one of the parties is connected to the forum court is enough
ground for the court to exercise jurisdiction.
Second, the courts should use the incident approach to differentiate between cases
where the parties seek adversarial court procedures, such as those dividing marital
property, from those which seek to legitimize the union. Marriage creates different rights.
In dealing with the subject matter, the court should take into account the context of each
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case. Where the parties solely seek matrimonial relief, recognition of same-sex marriage
for this adversarial procedure would not imply endorsement of the union or behaviors
associated with the practice.
In countries where same-sex marriage is domestically recognized, the following
lessons could be legislated for application. First, authorities should not celebrate a samesex marriage between two persons if the personal law of one (or both) do not allow samesex marriage. This will limit the limping marriage phenomenon, where a marriage that is
valid under one law would not be recognized in another jurisdiction. This position is
reflected by Belgium where only couples from countries with the freedom to enter into a
same-sex marriage under their personal law can be married under Belgian law.368 In
countries where same-sex marriage is legal, citizens of other countries who are residents
in those jurisdictions should not be allowed to enter into a same-sex marriage without
recourse to the law of the country of their nationality or domicile.369
Related to the above is that states which perform same-sex marriages should
provide a forum for matrimonial actions arising from such marriages. In Canada, and in
states such as California, Delaware, Illinois, and Oregon, legislation allows couples who
celebrate their same-sex marriage in these jurisdictions to dissolve them in that state,
even if the only connecting factor to the jurisdiction is that it is the place of marriage.370
As the court rightly noted in V & L v. Attorney General of Canada, a country that allows
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foreigners to celebrate their same-sex marriage in the jurisdiction cannot later claim to
have no responsibility to them.371

3. Final Remarks
The discussion of the conflict of laws issues that may arise from the nonrecognition of same-sex marriage in selected English-speaking African countries has
shown that the strict application of the rule of non-recognition, where the court gives no
legal effect to a foreign same-sex union, is unworkable and leads to arbitrary and unfair
results. It is admitted that the recommendations offered to deal with this problems may
not be fool-proof. However, it is possible that their application will enable Englishspeaking African countries to effectively begin to come to terms with the cross-border
issues that may arise from same-sex relationships whose incidents find presence or
repercussions within their jurisdiction.

371

V & L v. Attorney General of Canada (05 April 2011), Ottawa 11/367893 (Ont Superior Court) at para
76.
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